University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

January 2013

Comparative Political Corruption in the United
States: The Florida Perspective
Andrew Jonathon Wilson
University of South Florida, ajw4141@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the Political Science Commons, and the Public Policy Commons
Scholar Commons Citation
Wilson, Andrew Jonathon, "Comparative Political Corruption in the United States: The Florida Perspective" (2013). Graduate Theses
and Dissertations.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/4613

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Comparative Political Corruption in the United States:
The Florida Perspective

by

Andrew J. Wilson

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Department of Government and International Affairs
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Florida
Major Professor: Darrell Slider, Ph.D.
Judithanne Scourfield McLauchlan, Ph.D.
Janna Merrick, Ph.D.
Date of Approval:
March 5, 2013
Keywords: Anti-Corruption Measures, Campaign Finance, Florida Politics, Florida
Government, Domestic Comparative Corruption
Copyright © 2013, Andrew J. Wilson

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my family, and particularly to my late grandfather
Newton A. Wilson. Without their love, guidance, and support I would not have been able
to conceive of, let alone finish an undertaking of this magnitude. I also wish to thank my
wife and best friend, Marissa, for her love and support not just throughout this program,
but every academic undertaking leading up to this. I also thank and dedicate this thesis to
my friends, who are the family you choose.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to acknowledge the support, guidance, and especially the patience of
members of my thesis committee, Dr. Judithanne Scourfield McLauchlan, Dr. Janna
Merrick, and committee chairperson Dr. Darrell Slider. In addition to my committee, I
also wish to thank the mentors, teachers, and professors who helped me to reach this
point, in particular Civil Air Patrol’s William Boyd, Boca Ciega High School’s Jeff
Henson, and William Klein and Lee Ann Miller from St. Petersburg College, all of whom
are listed alphabetically. I also wish to acknowledge several others who have provided
tremendous help to make this possible: Jennifer Woroner of USF St. Petersburg’s College
of Arts and Sciences, Verlisa Brascom of the USF Department of Government and
International Affairs, the staff and student assistants at the Nelson Poynter Memorial
Library at USF St. Petersburg, the staff and student assistants of the USF Tampa Library,
the staff, student assistants, and faculty of the USF Graduate School, USF College of Arts
and Sciences, and the Department of Government and International Affairs.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Tables

ii

List of Figures

iii

Abstract

iv

Chapter One: Introduction
Florida – Political Free-for-All and Microcosm of the United States

1
2

Chapter Two: Modern Thought in Corruption Studies
Political Corruption – Diversified Fields and Diversified Opinions
Defining Political Corruption – Issues in Operationalization
The Ideal World: International Models for Combating Corruption
Transparency International and the National Integrity System
The United Nations Human Security Model

11
11
18
21
21
24

Chapter Three: Comparing the States
Get in Line: Ranking the States
Institutions First: Findings of the State Integrity Investigation
Law and Order: Total and Per Capita Corruption Convictions
It’s the Perception: Results from a Survey of State Reporters
E Pluribus Unum: Consolidating Approaches, the Meta-Study

27
27
31
34
38
40

Chapter Four: Corruption in Florida
Statutes Chapter 838 – Criminalized Corruption
Florida Statutes Chapter 112, Part III – The Code of Ethics
Florida Evaluated Through the National Integrity System Lens
Case Studies in Political Corruption

44
45
50
51
68

Chapter Five: Conclusions

77

References

83

!

"!

LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.1, The National Integrity System Pillars Explained

23

Table 2.2, Elements of the Human Security Model

25

Table 3.1, State Integrity Investigation – Investigation Categories

32

Table 3.2, State Integrity Investigation Rankings

33

Table 3.3, Total Number of Federal Corruption Convictions by State

34

Table 3.4, Per Capita Number of Federal Corruption Convictions by State

37

Table 3.5, Boylan & Long (2003) Survey of Journalists

38

Table 3.6, Averaged Rankings

41

!

""!

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1, Pillars of the National Integrity System

!

"""!

22

ABSTRACT
Political corruption is a cancer – a malignant phenomenon that affects every
political system and every person in the world. Corruption undermines the very fabric of
society and the faith of people in their government. It makes goods more expensive,
stymies development in developing nations, and it makes both the United States and the
world a more dangerous place. Because of its negative effects and universality,
corruption should be studied. Its study leads to greater understanding, the discovery of
effective approaches to prevention, and restored faith in political systems. Its study also
illuminates and breaks down barriers to effective government while empowering officials
who put constituents before themselves to act. In this analysis, modern literature and
analyses are examined to gain better understanding of the nature and wider study of
corruption, rankings of the American states are analyzed and a meta-study completed to
rank the states along broader criteria, and one particular state – Florida – is examined
closely as a case study in political corruption. Why Florida? Florida is the fourth largest
state in the United States, has a racially and socioeconomically diverse population, and
the highest number of convictions for corruption of any other state for the last decade.
The result of this study is a deeper insight into political corruption as a field of study,
better understanding of defining and measuring political corruption, and potential policy
remedies to reduce it. The results come with implications for a wide variety of academic
fields with vested interest in the study of political corruption along with nonacademic
audiences seeking to rid themselves of this cancer of government.
!
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION

The question of political corruption and its effect on the political process is a
riddle as old as the study of politics itself. Corruption as an object of academic study is
viewed through the lenses of many disciplines. Just a few of these approaches view
political corruption as an economic problem, as a criminal problem, or also as an ethical
or moral problem. While corruption is extensively studied, there is a perplexing data
problem in the comparative study of corruption in American politics. The lack of
comparative academic study is particularly true when comparing the relative political
corruption between the 50 states (Goel & Nelson, 2011). A lone academic study
completed in 2003 (Boylan & Long) measures the perceived political corruption based
upon a survey of state house journalists. Another source of comparative corruption data is
the U.S. Department of Justice’s Public Integrity Section, which compiles data related to
federal corruption prosecutions by jurisdiction of U.S. Attorneys. The use of these two
sources of data provide the framework for further study based upon data focused on statelevel perceptions (in the case of Boylan & Long) and data focused on federal corruption
convictions from the U.S. Department of Justice, however both approaches arrive at very
different conclusions when ranking states relative to corruption. An example of this is the
U.S. Department of Justice (2007) showing Florida as the most corrupt state in the United
States because Florida has the highest number of corruption convictions for the ten-year
period preceding the report. When taking population into account and producing a per
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capita corruption conviction ranking of the states, Florida drops to tenth most corrupt
state (Marsh, 2008, WK3). The situation becomes more perplexing for researchers when
states are ranked based upon journalist perceptions. In this model, Florida becomes the
22nd most corrupt state (Boylan & Long, 2003). Still further complicating matters are
independently produced, nonacademic state rankings such as the State Integrity
Investigation (n.d.) that rank states based upon anti-corruption institutions and state laws
related to transparency in government and public corruption. In a state ranking produced
in 2011, Florida was the 33rd most corrupt state in the United States. This means that in a
time period covering 1997-2011, Florida was simultaneously the 1st, the 10th, the 22nd,
and the 33rd most corrupt state in the United States. Based upon this data discrepancy,
further research is needed. The use of a meta-study approach for reconciling these
divergent rankings may produce a more comprehensive ranking of the states in the
United States. In addition to numerical indices, a comprehensive case study approach is
useful in better understanding the anti-corruption institutions in a particular state will fill
in the gaps left by the use of other ranking models. For purposes of this qualitative
analysis, Florida was selected for two reasons: 1) its prominence in the rankings and 2)
because Florida is representative of the United States as a whole.

Florida – Political Free-for-All and Microcosm of the United States

Florida is at the same time a unique entity among the states of the United States
yet also representative of the nation as a whole. Since her discovery in 1513, Florida has
been an exotic land of loblolly pine trees and dense palmetto forests, modern-day
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dinosaurs and space travel, and a cultural heritage rich in the spirit of adventure, the folly
of fortune-seeking, and unique characters found in no other place on earth (Mormino,
2005). The same spirit of adventure and treasure hunting that was manifested in Ponce de
Leon’s Spanish conquistadors who became the first Europeans to lay their eyes upon the
“land of flowers” endures to modern time. This sense of adventure and folly may also be
seen in Florida’s culture, its history, and its politics. Florida is unique for a myriad of
reasons, but few so much as its distinctive brand of politics (Colburn, 2007). In fact,
Florida has often been the subject of jokes about what is wrong with American politics
and cynical Tocquevilleian observations about the less-than-democratic nature of the
Unites States’ democratic elections (The Economist, 2012). These jokes often involve the
2000 presidential election recount in several Florida counties, but few so noteworthy as
Broward and Palm Beach Counties and the distinctive cast of characters who
accompanied the scandalous recount including former Secretary of State Katherine Harris
and former Governor Jeb Bush. Also noteworthy is the unnamed Broward County
elections official gone cross-eyed staring at a “hanging chad” through a magnifying glass
who himself became a symbol for this recount. Other, more recent supporting members
of Florida’s cast of political characters include Florida’s former governor Charlie Crist
(Smith, 2006), disgraced and impeached federal judge-turned-congressman Alcee
Hastings (Marcus, 1989), and one of only two sitting members of Congress to have flown
in space, Senator Bill Nelson (Nelson & Buckingham, 1988) who did so while chair of
NASA’s oversight subcommittee in the U.S. House of Representatives.
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Florida has a political culture unlike any other place in the United States. There
are many reasons for this including Florida’s dramatic growth and the constant influx of
new residents, single party rule for more than the last century (first Democrats and then
Republicans), (Colburn, 2007)(Williamson, 1976) and the billions of dollars to be made
both by selling every inch of beachfront property by snatching it from the pockets of
unsuspecting tourists (Mormino, 2005), and incredible (seemingly one-sided) successful
partnership between the Disney Corporation and the city of Orlando (Foglesong, 2001).
The seminal expert on the politics of the Southern United States, V. O. Key, Jr. observes,
“the search for coherent, organized political leadership in Florida seems futile in
whatever direction one looks.” (Key, 1949) Key also goes on:

The unorganized condition of Florida politics manifests itself also in the fact that
candidates for the national house and Senate operate independently of each other
and of candidates for the governorship and other state offices. This political
individualism gives great weight to factors such as personality and skill on the
stump. In the confusion of individual candidacies, consistency by the electorate is
purely fortuitous. In fact, the more general consequence is that the only genuine
choice is between personalities who struggle simply to make themselves known,
and not disagreeably. When opportunity for meaningful choice arises its existence
is often concealed. (Key, 1949)

The untamed, unsettled, ‘Wild West’ style of Florida politics to which Key
alluded – more than 60 years ago – is as much the rule now as it was then, with few
differences. Over time, Florida has changed and reformed the ways in which elections are
held and implemented term limits for state officials. In many ways, Florida has been on
the cutting edge of governmental and public service reform for several reasons, but
4!

namely due to the creativity and progressive nature of Florida’s corrupt public officials
and special interests – rapidly finding paths around newly-implemented reforms
(MacKay & Edmonds, 2010, p. 13-18).

Also necessary to understanding Florida’s politics is the fact that the landmass
was first ruled by indigenous peoples, then claimed by Spain, then Britain, the Spain
again, the United States, the Confederate States, and then once again by the United States
(Gannon, 2003). According to the State Constitutional Revisions Commission, Florida’s
government has also been organized under five state constitutions: adopted in 1838,
1861, 1865, 1868, and most recently in 1968 (Statutes and Constitution, 1998). This past
political instability, combined with contemporary Florida’s population imported from
other states and countries has resulted in the phenomenon described by V. O. Key (1949),
a state without political organization and little loyalty within its political system. Yet
inexplicably, it may seem, Florida may be home to some of the most organized, systemic
political corruption in the United States – some of which brought about by wellintentioned reforms designed to reduce political corruption (Dyckman, 2008). The notion
of Florida as a land of massive profit potential with little work and a place where one
need not be an insider to get ahead has produced massive booms in Florida’s economy
(Mormino, 2005). Florida’s economic booms typically involve the intersection of tourism
and real estate where vacationers are afforded the opportunity to ‘buy a piece of paradise”
(Mormino, 2005). Inevitably residential builders, real estate agents, and commercial
developers reap the profits of these enterprises in favorable economic times. Indeed
Florida’s economy itself is structured for good economic times and ill prepared to fund
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state, county, and municipal governments during an economic downturn. During the
period of sustained growth from 1970 through 2000, Florida’s population grew from
approximately 6,791,000 residents to 15,982,000 residents – an increase of more than 235
percent (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013)(Dye, Jewett & MacManus, 2007). Additionally, an
April 2006 report in Florida Trend magazine estimated that Florida’s population once
had a daily gain of 1,890 residents, the loss of 945 residents, and 115 births (minus
deaths) for an average daily increase of 1,060 residents (Dye, et al., 2007). This stunning,
sustained growth easily explains the reluctant attitudes of Florida’s political leaders in
working for diversification and sustainability in Florida’s economy and tax structure. The
rootlessness of Florida’s population, the lack of organization and an every-man-forhimself attitude has opened the door to the reputation of a high level of public corruption
and improper influence – as evidenced by the books of authors like Carl Hiaasen and the
unflattering “Florida” category of news stories on blogs such as Fark and Gawker.
Combining this perception with well-intentioned legislation related to term limits has
further served to empower nonelected political actors including lobbyists, political
consultants, and career legislative staff who never seem to actually leave the capital,
Tallahassee (Carsey & Nelson, 2008, p. 108) (Wagner & Prier, 2008, p. 159-160). The
end result of this atmosphere is a political system ripe for the picking.
While Florida’s political system is very much a free-for-all influence market
(Johnston, 2005), it has seen entrenched power structures come and go, typically at the
hand of demographic, not democratic, change (Dye, et al., 2008). Such an example of an
entrenched power structure was Florida’s “Pork Chop Gang,” a group of legislators
representing rural areas and counties with small populations (Colburn, 2007, p. 33).
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Through the control of the legislative district apportionment process via seniority and
gerrymandering, these legislators were able to devote much of Florida’s budget to rural
areas and advance a regressive policy opposed to civil rights, desegregation, and public
service reforms throughout much of the 19050s (Colburn, 2007) (MacKay & Edmonds,
2010) (Karl, 2010). Since the time of the pork chop gang, Florida has experienced
sweeping changes to the method and results of the reapportionment process, but none that
has resulted in true depoliticalization of reapportionment itself (Associated Press, 2012).
In today’s Florida, voter demographics and party affiliation have changed in such a way
as to give the Democratic Party a nearly 560,000 voter registration majority over the
Republican Party (NVRA Statistics, 2013), which currently holds 76 out of 120 seats in
the Florida House of Representatives (Florida House of Representatives, 2012). It is
likely that Republican control of the reapportionment process has resulted in this
disproportionate representation in Florida just as the efforts of the pork chop gang did in
the 1950s.

Moving

forward

from

an

often-hateful

history

of

discrimination,

disenfranchisement, and prejudice (Dyckman, 2006, 2008, and 2011) (Warren, 2008),
Florida has experienced massive cultural changes as the population has grown (Dye, et
al., 2008). What was once the least populated state of the old Confederacy (Colburn &
deHaven-Smith, 2002) now boasts the fourth largest population of any state and is soon
to overtake New York to become the third most populous state in the United States
(Morel, 2013). These changes have brought with them their own growing pains as
Florida’s resources, infrastructure, and government are stressed to the maximum to
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accommodate the influx of new residents. These changes have also resulted in a lack of
cultural identity for native Floridians, who make up less than 25% of the state’s
population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013) (Colburn & deHaven-Smith, 2002). With nearly
three-quarters of the population coming from another state or country, Floridians develop
a regional identity based upon the part of the state in which they find themselves. There
are few clearer indicators of identity than a recent data analysis completed by Facebook
(Taylor, 2013) that breaks down fans of NFL teams by the county in which they live.
Florida is a state with three professional football teams: the Jacksonville Jaguars, the
Tampa Bay Buccaneers, and the Miami Dolphins. However, this Facebook analysis finds
that, while there are large, healthy pockets of fans for each of these teams, there are also
entire counties where the most popular NFL team is not the home team, but rather the
Pittsburgh Steelers, the New York Giants, the New Orleans Saints, the Dallas Cowboys,
or the New England Patriots (Taylor, 2013). Interestingly enough, this out of state team
loyalty fits with the locations from which new Florida residents started out: 25% from the
Northeast, 14.6% from other Southern states, and 23% from states outside the South or
Northeast (such as the Midwest) (Colburn & deHaven-Smith, 2002). These places are
otherwise known as Giants, Patriots, Saints, and Steelers territory. This Facebook
analysis also reveals that certain football teams know no geographical limitations when it
comes to their fan base: the Dallas Cowboys and the Pittsburgh Steelers. Given resident
populations of Florida residents who are dedicated fans of these NFL teams, we can only
presume that this is yet another indicator of Florida’s place as a reflection of the United
States at large.
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It is also possible to view Florida as reflective of the larger nation when
considering the outcome of presidential elections. Florida sided with the eventual winner
of the five most recent presidential elections (2012, 2008, 2004, 2000, and 1996).
Excluding 1992, this streak includes the elections in 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980, and 1988 –
meaning Florida has helped to decide the eventual winner of the White House in 10 out
of the last 11 presidential elections. Going back even further, one has to look at the
presidential election of 1924 to find another election in which the state did not pick the
winner giving Florida the distinction of making the same choice as the entire country in
20 of the last 22 elections, or 90.9% of the time (270 To Win, 2012). It has been argued
that Florida is a must win state simply because of the sheer number of Electoral College
votes it brings to the table – 29 after the 2010 reapportionment. However, in elections
prior to the 1960s, Florida had a paltry 10 Electoral College votes (270 To Win, 2012)
making the state just another Southern state.

Taking all of this into consideration, we are left to wonder what Florida’s
swashbuckling culture, huge population, diversity, and political culture all have to do
with political corruption in the United States. All of these things combine to make Florida
an almost ideal laboratory for studying political corruption in the United States. In the
rankings studied as part of this analysis, we find that Florida is roughly in the middle of
all of the other states when it comes to the question of corruption except for one issue:
Florida has the highest number of federal convictions for political corruption of any state
in the United States for the years 1998 through 2007 (U.S. Department of Justice, 2007).
This window is significant because it provides a contextual window around the only
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comparative academic study available (Boylan & Long, 2003). According to this measure
of federal convictions, Florida is theoretically by far the most corrupt state in the country.
Does this mean that convictions are emblematic of an even larger corruption problem or a
sign that the problem has been solved since corrupt individuals have been brought to
justice? Are Florida anti-corruption laws so hopelessly ineffective and corruption so
rampant that this is just the tip of the iceberg or are Florida’s institutions perfectly suited
to deal with the deeply insidious problem of political corruption? Through the astounding
and sometimes amusing adventure that is research in political corruption, we will discuss
contemporary thought in political corruption along with comparative models with an
international and human security focus into the topic. We will also complete a metaanalysis of how the states are ranked from most to least corrupt and the criteria used for
such a ranking – demonstrating that purely quantitative measures of corruption (i.e.
convictions) do not paint a complete picture of comparative corruption in the United
States. Lastly, we will review Florida’s approach to political corruption through its laws,
institutions, and case studies of both legitimate political corruption and events that can be
perceived as political corruption.
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CHAPTER TWO – MODERN THOUGHT IN CORRUPTION STUDIES

Political Corruption – Diversified Fields and Diversified Opinions

If the study of politics is in fact the study of power, then certainly the corruption
of legitimate political authority becomes a central theme of political inquiry. In this way,
political corruption is a recurring theme in many seemingly unrelated political topics.
Conversely, this study is focused on analyzing political corruption within the United
States of America with a particular focus on the state of Florida. To this end, it is
necessary to visit the liberal political theories that gave rise to the desire for the former
American colonies to become independent and the subsequent political theories
addressing the development of a new American democracy from its infancy to present
day. In a story well-known and well-tested among students of American politics and
history, the framers of the American constitution viewed the corruption of the ruling
system of government of the United Kingdom as a catalyst for independence. The
accusation of “taxation without representation” was itself a criticism of an unfair,
aristocratic system of government thrust upon what had been a nation of loyal followers
of the British crown. Rather than representation by elected representatives of the people
themselves, governors ruled colonies with only a minor role for assemblies of elected
residents. With all of the meaningful political power in a colony resting with the colonial
governor, the assemblies were unable to go against the will of this executive without
11!

resorting to a Lockeian argument over the legitimacy of the governor’s powers and the
consent of the governed (Berkin, Miller, Cherny, & Gormly, 2006). These early
rejections of imperial power set the stage for the American suspicion of those in power
along with rudimentary safeguards against the perceived corruption of the colonial
system. From these beginnings, the United States grew into a system of elected
government at the national, state, and local levels. With democracy, however, came new
problems and new corruption. However, American independence left the young nation
with the same corruption that had existed before independence: bribery, legislative
logrolling, foreign influence of elected officials, clandestine monitoring of political
opponents’ offices, and the ever-changing issues surrounding campaign finances
(Johnston, 2005, p. 64).

An interesting fact about American political corruption is its regular resurgence.
According to Sabato and Simpson’s history on the subject (1996, p.16), there has been a
major national scandal every fifty years since 1872: the Credit Mobilier scandal (18721873), the Teapot Dome scandal (1923-1924), and Watergate (1972-1974). Not
mentioned in this book are scandals involving the alleged perjury of President Bill
Clinton in 1998 (Foerstel, 2001). The pace of national scandals seems to have only
accelerated with the information age and the dawn of the 24-hour news cycle. Combining
this with the amateurization of political journalism – the idea that anybody with a
computer and a free blog is a political journalist – has also resulted in a sea change in
how Americans approach their politics (H. Thomas, 2006). Further muddying the waters
is the effect of gerrymandered ‘safe’ Congressional districts sending ever more polarized
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representatives to Washington, DC. This gives us an atmosphere where collaboration is
discouraged. It gives us an atmosphere where the political process is no longer about
results, but winning news cycles or defeating an idea formulated by the opposition. An
atmosphere of vitriol where everybody is a journalist looking for a ‘gotcha moment’ and
breaking a story about some politician or official from the other party’s misdeeds,
misquotes, or unsavory distant past (E. Thomas, 2004, p. 51). The odd thing about all of
this – our great modern age of bitter brinksmanship in the political arena – is that this
isn’t anything new (Berkin, et al. 2006). The key differences are the speed at which
information is distributed and the number of zeros behind the amounts of money spent.
We also seem to have advanced well past the point of sanctioned executions and dueling
politicians because of simple policy disagreements – though if only barely (Read, 2013).

Taking this altogether, we are left to wonder: what is the state of research in the
subfield of political corruption? It is first important to examine why we spend so much
time and effort researching and analyzing corruption. Simply put, the reason political
scientists study political corruption is because it affects the lives of every person in every
country in the world. Political corruption in one form or another is a universal concept
that transcends language, culture, ethnicity, religion, and any number of other
characteristics that differentiate person from person and country from country.
Corruption also brings with it considerable cost. Transparency International (n.d.)
describes the cost of corruption this way:
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The cost of corruption is four-fold: political, economic, social, and
environmental. On the political front, corruption constitutes a major obstacle to
democracy and the rule of law. In a democratic system, offices and institutions
lose their legitimacy when they are misused for private advantage. Though this is
harmful in the established democracies, it is even more so in newly emerging
ones. Accountable political leadership cannot develop in a corrupt climate.
Economically, corruption leads to the depletion of national wealth. It is often
responsible for the funneling of scarce public resources to uneconomic highprofile projects, such as dams, power plants, pipelines and refineries, at the
expense of less spectacular but fundamental infrastructure projects such as
schools, hospitals and roads, or the supply of power and water to rural areas.
Furthermore, it hinders the development of fair market structures and distorts
competition, thereby deterring investment. The effect of corruption on the social
fabric of society is the most damaging of all. It undermines people's trust in the
political system, in its institutions and its leadership. Frustration and general
apathy among a disillusioned public result in a weak civil society. That in turn
clears the way for despots as well as democratically elected yet unscrupulous
leaders to turn national assets into personal wealth. Demanding and paying bribes
become the norm. Those unwilling to comply often emigrate, leaving the country
drained of its most able and most honest citizens. Environmental degradation is
yet another consequence of corrupt systems. The lack of, or non-enforcement of,
environmental regulations and legislation has historically allowed the North to
export its polluting industry to the South. At the same time, careless exploitation
of natural resources, from timber and minerals to elephants, by both domestic and
international agents has led to ravaged natural environments. Environmentally
devastating projects are given preference in funding, because they are easy targets
for siphoning off public money into private pockets. (Transparency International,
2000)
While the United States experiences political corruption differently from the developing
world, many of the effects remain the same (Johnson, LaFountain & Yamarik, 2011).
This is particularly true in the case of the eroding trust in government and elected
leadership. Studying political corruption is not easy and researchers are often challenged
to define corruption, devise a plan for measuring it, and finding a research design that is
both precise and can be replicated. Large nongovernmental organizations such as
Transparency International and Global Integrity study corruption, but do so based upon
polling and the measured perception of political corruption. Perception is often used in
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lieu of event-based data because little to no data exists on corrupt activities (Global
Integrity, 2011). Generally, corrupt police officers do not record, report, and tally the
bribes they receive each day. This presents considerable data problems for researchers
seeking to gain a better understanding of the prevalence of corruption or even to establish
a baseline before testing a reform. This dichotomy between perception and action gives
us a quandary as researchers. We have to ask which came first: the corruption or the
perception? It’s an academic version of the classic chicken or the egg dilemma.
Nongovernmental organizations have answered this question in their own way. For
example, Transparency International (2000) uses a perception index combined with an
analysis of each country’s institutions to determine which country is the most corrupt.
Instead of focusing on a pure comparative study of corruption, some researchers have
instead dedicated themselves to researching the causes and motivations of corrupt actors,
while others seek to find new and unique ways in which corrupt political actors gain
private benefit from their public service.

Perhaps the greatest advantage for this broadly defined subfield of political
science lies in its relative lack of clear data points or concrete indicators of corruption.
The study of corruption is hardly unique to political scientists and has yielded a variety of
study in several disciplines. There have been economic studies examining the effect of
corruption on anything from the utilization of World Bank funds in developing nations to
the effects of corruption on the bottom lines of multinational corporations. There is a line
of thought that the predictability of corrupt behaviors such as bribery bring order and are
both a stabilizing force and a beneficial factor in developing countries (Huntington,
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1968). There are studies in the field of journalism analyzing how news coverage of
scandals has changed over time (Foerstel, 2001) and how media coverage affects public
opinion and broader civic life (McCombs, Holbert, Kiousis, & Wanta, 2011).
Criminology studies have also been completed looking at corruption as a white-collar
crime (Brightman & Howard, 2009). Studies of corruption and corrupt actors also exist in
African-American studies where institutionalized harassment of black elected officials
has affected the country as a whole (Musgrove, 2012). These studies do not reflect the
large number of studies that include corruption in other subfields of political science. In
fact, each of the forty-three organized sections of the American Political Science
Association (n.d.) could, should, and has studied corruption within their own subfield.
This richly diverse field of study has truly yielded insight into just how universal the
effects of corruption can be in a wide variety of academic fields.

The academic study of political corruption brings to the table a rich variety of
literature from many different academic disciplines. For political scientists, the primary
focus of discussion regarding political corruption boils down to three key questions: 1)
how does one define corruption, 2) how does one measure corruption, and 3) is
corruption in one country equivalent to corruption in another? There are relatively few
topics within political science as controversial and ill defined as is political corruption. In
fact, the relatively clear definitions of other topics in political science make the field
especially accessible to researchers – that is in situations where criteria and measures are
firmly defined. Researchers measuring electoral performance have innumerable
quantitative indicators at their disposal: vote counts, voter turnout percentages,
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demographics, and political ideology expressed through voter registration data. Those
who analyze and research public law have case law, statutes, and legal opinions from the
judges who make each decision. Those who study political economy have tremendous
resources in the form of economic performance data available to study the effects of
changes within a state’s economy. Conversely, those who study political corruption at
any level are left with few choices for establishing concrete criteria that are comparable
across states, precise, and skewed one way or the other by the very corruption being
measured.

Attempts at isolating and measuring actual corruption within a state can reasonably
be compared to tracking and apprehending a skilled jewel thief. In fact, a review of recent
literature (Johnson, LaFountain & Yamarik, 2011), (Alt & Lassen, 2007), and (Goel &
Nelson, 2010) shows the most common source of measureable data for studying
comparative political corruption between the 50 American states is the U.S. Department
of Justice’s Public Integrity Section’s annual report to Congress listing the total number
of convictions for federal corruption offenses by U.S. District Attorney’s jurisdiction
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2007). Another study (Boylan & Long, 2003) compiled a
survey of journalists from each of the 50 states and ranked the states based upon this
perception. Goel and Nelson (2011) go so far as to say “surveys of corruption perceptions
for the United States have been nonexistent until a recent survey by Boylan and Long
(2003) of state house journalists regarding their perceptions of corruption.” With this lack
of meaningful academic survey data, researchers are forced to rely on data covering
federal convictions that do not account for the state-level crimes, local crimes, and
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violations of codes of ethics – all of which could constitute acts of political corruption
that would go unreported by the Department of Justice in its annual report. Such is the
case; future studies of comparative corruption in the United States must look beyond
federal convictions and the 2003 survey to meet the needs of rigorous studies and
analyses into this topic.

Defining Political Corruption – Issues in Operationalization

As a subject, political corruption is a concept that is both universally understood,
yet poorly defined. One can easily conceive of political corruption as simple bribery,
awarding contracts to family or friends without competition, or circumventing legal
processes for personal benefit. As a subject, a layperson sees corruption as activity that is
clearly ethically wrong – particularly in democratic nations (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).
However, for one to fully understand the concept of corruption and to move forward with
analyzing the subject, a clear definition is needed. In fact, the creation of a definition
presents many challenges to both researchers and policymakers endeavoring to reduce
corruption. Petter Langseth, the Programme Manager of the United Nations’ Global
Programme against Corruption had this to say about defining corruption during the
United Nations’ early steps in formulating its approach to combating corruption (2006, p.
9):
There is no single, comprehensive, universally accepted definition of
corruption. Attempts to develop such a definition invariably encounter legal,
criminological and, in many countries, political problems.
When the negotiations of the United Nations Convention against
Corruption began in early 2002, one option under consideration was not to define
corruption at all but to list specific types or acts of corruption. Moreover,
18!

proposals to require countries to criminalise corruption mainly covered specific
offences that depended on what type of conduct was involved, whether those
implicated were public officials, whether cross-border conduct or foreign officials
were involved and if the cases related to unlawful or improper enrichment.
(Langseth, 2006, p. 9)
As one can imagine, working toward international agreement on any subject is a difficult
undertaking. This is especially true of political corruption as many of the same officials
improperly benefiting from their public offices may be the same officials on a UN
commission defining and investigating corruption. The choice to not define corruption as
a broader concept is a logical response to resistance one might encounter from corrupt
officials who find themselves included in such a definition.

Laura S. Underkuffler (2009 p. 28) discusses further difficulties in defining
corruption beyond the applied issues of enlisting assistance from officials who may be
included in such a definition:

A uniform understanding of corruption has not emerged from these academic
efforts. Although there is popular understanding of corruption that is shared by
politicians, journalists, and the ‘man on the street,’ academic theorists have
advanced a multiplicity of meanings, with more or less scrutiny or explicit
understanding of the underlying idea. (Underkuffler, 2009, p. 28)
Underkuffler goes on to discuss several approaches to definitions of corruption along the
lines of a public duty, as an economic behavior, and as a primarily illegal activity (among
several other approaches). Ultimately though, none of the approaches discussed in the
chapter include the morality and ethics of corrupt behavior itself. Underkuffler argues
that the base of corrupt behavior is the morality of the individual undertaking corrupt
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behavior and that only through a moralistic approach to the issue can full understanding,
and ultimately meaningful approaches to prevention, occur. This is particularly
significant as the public conceives of corruption as an immoral activity (Underkuffler,
2009, p. 37-41). In closing, Underkuffler explains:

This view [of corruption as an issue of morality] tells us that until we come to
grips with the moral dimensions of this problem, our prescriptions for attacking
this phenomenon will miss the essence of what popular attitudes may correctly
recognize as the underlying problem, and the composition of the distinctly
‘corrupt’ core. (Underkuffler, 2009, p. 42)

Pivoting from the academic debate surrounding a definition of corruption, we
come to the world of two prominent nongovernmental organizations: Global Integrity and
Transparency International. While a clear definition for corruption does not appear on
Global Integrity’s website (2013), the organization currently evaluates and ranks selected
nation states along the lines of relative corruption using a combination institution-based
approach for “quantitative” data, a “qualitative” peer-reviewed essay discussing the
effects of corruption on every day life written by a reporter based within a particular
country, and a chronology of nationwide corruption events prepared by the central
organization (Global Integrity, 2013). From this point, the information is aggregated into
a score and nations are ranked based upon this score. Global Integrity argues that because
it uses an experimental model for evaluating corruption that focuses on institutions and
specific corrupt actions, its evaluations are more robust and credible than findings from
other organizations (Global Integrity, 2013). Conversely, Transparency International,
another global nongovernmental organization that also measures and evaluates states
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based upon corruption does not share Global Integrity’s reluctance to provide a clear
definition of corruption, listing the organization’s definition at the top of its “Frequently
Asked Questions” page on its website:

Generally speaking as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. Corruption
can be classified as grand, petty and political, depending on the amounts of
money lost and the sector where it occurs.
Grand corruption consists of acts committed at a high level of government that
distort policies or the central functioning of the state, enabling leaders to benefit at
the expense of the public good.
Petty corruption refers to everyday abuse of entrusted power by low- and midlevel public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens, who often are
trying to access basic goods or services in places like hospitals, schools, police
departments and other agencies.
Political corruption is a manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of
procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political decision
makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, status and wealth.
(Transparency International, n.d.)

Combining the role of public office, the notion of personal gain, and issues of ethics and
morality, perhaps the best operational definition for corruption would be the immoral use
of political power or authority for personal gain.

The Ideal World – International Models for Combating Corruption

Transparency International and the National Integrity System - Florida’s
government has taken several steps to provide for an open, transparent government in
light of several past political and judicial scandals (Dyckman, 2008). These reforms,
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which began with the state’s revised 1968 state constitutional convention (Statutes and
Constitution, 1998) closely mirror those suggested in the National Integrity System
developed by the nongovernmental organization Transparency International and
described in its “TI Sourcebook 2000” (Transparency International, 2000) publication.
The National Integrity System forms the basis for Transparency International’s
evaluations on the relative ‘corruptness’ of each national political system. The National
Integrity System forms a blueprint for a national governmental system that uses
accountability to reduce or eliminate political corruption within a government.
Transparency International argues that each “pillar” demonstrates a “holistic approach to
countering corruption” (Transparency International, 2000). As one can see from the
following diagram provided on the Transparency International website, it is believed that
adhering to the pillars of the NIS will result in the rule of law reigning supreme,
sustainable development, and a higher quality of life.

Figure 2.1, Pillars of the National Integrity System
(Transparency International, 2000)
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The National Integrity System model uses a number of pillars resting upon the foundation
of existing political, sociological, and economic institutions within a particular state.
From this foundation, the model extends several pillars that are designed to represent
political reforms that will reduce corruption or enhance governmental accountability
within a state. From the 2000 TI Sourcebook, the National Integrity System pillar system
is indicated as follows:

Table 2.1, The National Integrity System Pillars Explained
Institutional Pillar
Executive
Legislative/Parliament
Public Accounts Committee (of legislature)
Auditor General
Public service
Judiciary
Media
Civil society
Ombudsman
Anti-corruption/watchdog agencies
Private sector
International community

Corresponding Core Rules/Practices
Conflict of interest rules
Fair elections
Power to question senior officials
Public reporting
Public service ethics
Independence
Access to information
Freedom of speech
Records management
Enforceable and enforced laws
Competition policy, including public procurement rules
Effective legal/judicial assistance

(Transparency International, 2000)

One can easily see that these common sense institutional reforms could result in a lower
level of political corruption and can be applied to any state. To this end, we will apply
this model to Florida’s political institutions. In our examination of Florida’s political
system, one will see that Transparency International’s National Integrity System model is
lacking in several key areas. Despite having established strong institutions reflective of
those in Transparency International’s National Integrity System model, Florida is a state
dominated by single-party rule in which instances of political corruption and influence
peddling are quite frequent (Colburn, 2007) (Key, 1949) (State Integrity Investigation,
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2012). In the National Integrity System model provided by Transparency International,
(2000) it is quite apparent that National Integrity System both maintains a focus on
developing nations and is designed to benefit every other country wishing to further
strengthen its defenses against political corruption and to make corruption a “high risk,
low reward” enterprise.

The United Nations Human Security Model - The Human Security Model is a
framework for approaching and understanding the relative security and stability of a
particular region or state. The United Nations Development Programme’s 1994 Human
Development Report first described this model (United Nations, 1994). The Human
Security Model is distinctive for several reasons. First, it represents progress in the field
of human development and a new approach to the issues of stability in not just the
developing world. Second, the framework can be used to evaluate the relative stability of
any country in the world. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the model approaches
issues of stability from a participant perspective rather than the institution-based
perspectives of the Global Integrity, Transparency International, and State Integrity
Investigation models. While this is a largely qualitative model for understanding
development and stability issues, political corruption included, it does offer researchers
another lens through which to view perplexing political problems. For those who have
studied ethics and psychology, the various elements of the Human Security Model bear a
slight resemblance to the low to medium priority level of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs
(Maslow, 1970) in which the need for safety and security manifest once healthy
physiological functioning is assured. From the original 1994 United Nations Human
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Development Report, these are the elements of the Human Security Model (brief
explanations from Henk, 2005):

Table 2.2, Elements of the Human Security Model
ELEMENT

EXPLANATION

Economic Security

Economic security requires an assured basic income – usually from
productive and remunerative work, or in the last resort from some
publicly financed safety net.
Food security means that all people at all times have both physically and
economic access to basic food.
Health security is access to protections from diseases and unhealthy
lifestyles.
Environmental security is protection for people from short- and long-term
ravages of nature, man-made threats in nature, and deterioration of the
natural environment.
Personal security is protection for people from physical violence, whether
from the state, from external states, from violent individuals and sub-state
actors, from domestic abuse, from predatory adults, or even from the
individual himself (as in protection from suicide).
Community security is protection for people from the loss of traditional
relationships and values and from sectarians and ethnic violence.
Political security is the assurance that people live in a society that honors
their basic human rights.

Food Security
Health Security
Environmental Security
Personal Security

Community Security
Political Security

(United Nations, 1994) and (Henk, 2005)

Even a slight grounding in the psychology of the needs of political actors is worthy of
consideration in a model such as this. Interestingly enough, the issue of protection from
political corruption potentially fits into every element of the Human Security Model.
Political corruption in the form of corrupt governmental officials can disrupt private
property rights and damage the local economy, disrupting economic security. Political
corruption can endanger food security when international aid shipments are seized and
resold by corrupt actors. Both health and environmental security are put at risk when
health and environmental protection officials can be bribed. Personal and community
security are certainly endangered in the face of police corruption. Lastly, even the
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perception of political corruption is enough to disrupt political security within a
developing nation. Taking all of this together, the human security model seemingly
places a high priority on combating and preventing political corruption by recognizing its
corrosive role within developing societies. But is an international model for measuring
developing nations applicable to individual states within a country like the United States?
The answer to this question is an unequivocal yes, because every nation and every
subdivision thereof ought to be measured using the same rubric for the simple reason that
unless we evaluate a state’s institutions, we may never know what may be missing.
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CHAPTER THREE – COMPARING THE STATES

Get In Line: Ranking the States
It seems that no scholarly work discussing political corruption is complete
without a brief discussion of the obstacles facing those who research this subject.
Completing comparative studies in political corruption across the United States presents a
myriad of challenges to researchers. While the problems are many, there are two primary
concerns surrounding the study of political corruption. The first, and perhaps most
daunting is that political corruption is unseemly behavior that is more often than not
illegal. Therefore, it comes as no great surprise that corrupt political actors are not eager
to share their sketchy actions with academic researchers (Berlinski, 2009). The second,
more academic concern is the method by which corruption is measured and standardized
across all 50 states (Lancaster and Montinola, 2001). This topic is complicated by several
overlapping legal systems that all treat corruption differently. Still further complicating
matters is the dichotomy between federal, state, and local rules and regulations related to
appropriations, campaign finance, and lobbying (Tavits, 2007). To illustrate: candidates
for public office in Florida on the same November ballot could be subject to the rules and
regulations of the Federal Elections Commission, the Florida Elections Commission, the
Florida Commission on Ethics, and the elections governing body of individual counties
and cities. Behaviors permissible under the jurisdiction of one set of rules may not be
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legal activities under another governing body. Combining disparate laws on what
constitutes corruption, a variety of regulatory bodies on campaign activity, and
candidates routinely seeking different levels of political office opens the door for what
may be considered a corrupt action under one system, but legal under another. An
additional complication for comparative studies is an operational definition of political
corruption itself. Is political corruption limited only to campaign funding and influencing
voters? Is corruption a clear-cut phenomenon with identified motive, intent, and a clear
quid pro quo? Perhaps corruption is more insidious: a discount for local zoning board
members at a restaurant so the owner can get extra time to argue their perspective on a
zoning law, free carwashes for law enforcement officers at a particular gas station with a
chronic problem with loiterers, or a free oil change for city fleet managers at a car
dealership with a large fleet sales presence. Would these actions in and of themselves not
lay the groundwork for the perception of corruption or are they simply sound networking
by involved citizens? Examples such as these further demonstrate the challenges facing
corruption researchers.

For purposes of this analysis, several comparative rankings of domestic political
corruption in the United States will be evaluated. The first of these, the State Integrity
Investigation, is a joint project between the Center for Public Integrity, the
nongovernmental organization Global Integrity, and Public Radio International. The State
Integrity Investigation created a standardized formula measuring the anticorruption
measures of each state in an effort to compare them. From there, the organization reviews
the results with political experts and journalists in each state to produce an aggregate
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score relative to the political corruption in each state. The rankings are highly publicized
by the organization in an effort to lobby state legislatures and Congress to implement
more stringent anticorruption laws and other measures aimed at increasing transparency
in government. However, Integrity Florida has recently come under heavy criticism for
the appearance of partisan activity in accepting support from a partisan organization and
now serves as a sort of cautionary tale for aspiring reformers due to the ensuring scandal
– namely when it comes to accepting donations from advocacy groups for sponsored
research.

The next state ranking is a study published in 2003 by the journal State Politics &
Policy Quarterly (Boylan & Long, 2003). This ranking is based upon the results of a
survey of journalists asking them to rate their state based upon corruption perception and
a trailblazer in domestic comparative corruption studies as surveys were “nonexistent”
until this one was published (Goel & Nelson, 2011). A peer-reviewed journal, State
Politics & Policy Quarterly is affiliated with the American Political Science Association
and is the official journal of the organized section of researchers dedicated to the study of
state politics and policy. Neither the journal nor the American Political Science
Association advocate specific remedies or initiatives based upon the findings of any
research contained within this or any other affiliated journal.

The next two state rankings are compiled based upon the same data provided
annually by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Public Integrity Section. The primary data
from this report provides the total number of convictions for public corruption offenses
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prosecuted by United States Attorneys and is divided up by federal district. The report
provides data for a ten-year window. For our purposes, we will be using the report issued
to Congress in 2008, which contains data from 1997 through 2007. This will place the
Boylan and Long survey data roughly in the middle of the time period analyzed by the
Department of Justice. The total numbers were divided into per capita numbers by state
for an article that appeared in the New York Times (Marsh, 2008, WK3). The use of a
journalistic source for this study illustrates the role the media plays in advancing debate
and policies related to corruption (Charron, 2009)(McCombs, et al., 2011). It also further
underscores the lack of meaningful indices measuring public corruption in the United
States. Generally, corruption policy is a fairly low priority that only becomes prominent
after a scandal breaks. Such an example is the judiciary reform efforts in Florida
following widespread issues involving the Florida Supreme Court (Dyckman, 2008).
Additionally, relying on conviction criteria that does not account for accusations that
were not sustained, states where certain corrupt activities are not actually illegal, and
other similar standardization concerns. The article also does not clearly illustrate that the
convictions were for individuals convicted of crimes related to corruption who were not
necessarily public officials themselves.

In addition to the State Integrity Investigation, rankings of states based upon total
convictions for corruption offenses, states ranked by per capita political corruption
convictions, and the state-by-state journalist polling studies to be explored in depth, there
are two internationally focused anticorruption models to be considered when approaching
questions of comparative political corruption. Both international models support similar
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anticorruption measures and approach the question in a qualitative fashion, but from
varying perspectives. The first of these, Transparency International’s National Integrity
System views the issue of political corruption through an official or institution centric
perspective with the hypothesis that a well regulated political system with a strong code
of ethics will result in fewer instances of political corruption. The second of these, the
United Nations Human Security Model relies on a population-centric model wherein
improving the human security of a particular population will result in lower instances of
political corruption while improving quality of life.

Institutions First: The Findings of the State Integrity Investigation - The State
Integrity Investigation is perhaps the most prominent organization dedicated to
comparing the political corruption among the 50 American states. In many ways, it
mimics a few well known global nongovernmental organizations such as Transparency
International, Amnesty International, and the United Nations’ Human Development
Programme’s Human Security Unit. Each of these organizations takes certain key criteria
in their model for understanding corruption, safety, and human security and assigns a
score or grade based upon this information. The State Integrity Investigation does the
same, evaluating each of the United States and assigning a score. See table 3-1 for State
Integrity Investigation’s explanation (State Integrity Investigation, n.d.) for its chosen
criteria.
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Table 3.1, State Integrity Investigation - Investigation Categories
State Integrity Investigation
Criterion
Access to Information
Campaign Finance
Executive Accountability
Legislative Accountability

Judicial Accountability
State Budgeting
Civil Service Management

Procurement
Internal Auditing
Lobbying Disclosure
Pension Fund Management

Ethics Enforcement

Insurance Commissions

Redistricting

State Integrity Investigation’s Explanation
“What information is legally accessible in each state, and how
easily can citizens get it?”
“The financing of electoral campaigns at the federal, state, and
local levels.”
“Guidelines, laws, and procedures to ensure that governors and
cabinet-level officials can be held accountable for their
actions.”
“Laws, policies, and procedures to ensure that lawmakers –
who often work part-time and hold outside positions – best serve
their constituencies and not their own personal political
interests.”
“How accountable and transparent are judicial officials and
their staffs?”
“Is the state budget process open to the public or conducted
behind closed doors?”
“State hiring and firing regulations, nepotism, and cronyism
rules, whistleblower protections, and other guidelines designed
to ensure a competitive, safe, and professional work
environment for its employees.”
“State laws governing the purchase of goods and services.”
“State level internal auditing designed to add value and improve
state government operations.”
“Laws and practices that define what lobbyists can do as they
attempt to influence government actions.”
“Most states provide a defined pension plan that promises state
workers a specific annual payment once they retire from service.
Each state with a pension fund has policies governing state
contributions.”
“Forty-one states require external oversight of their procedures
through an Ethics Commission. An Ethics Commission is a
committee tasked with validating the ethical grounds of the state
government’s decisions.”
“States regulate the insurance industry to protect consumers.
Regulatory structures vary – the state may appoint a
commission or elect a single commissioner, for example – but
the overall mandate remains the same.”
“Following each U.S. census, states redraw the boundaries for
congressional and legislative districts.”

(State Integrity Investigation, n.d.)

Based upon these criteria, the State Integrity Investigation issued this ranking of each
state from most to least corrupt (State Integrity Investigation, 2012):
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Table 3.2, State Integrity Investigation Rankings
!"#"$%
&#'()'*%
Georgia
South Dakota
Wyoming
Virginia
Maine
South Carolina
Michigan
North Dakota
Nevada
Idaho
Maryland
New Mexico
Oklahoma
New York
Utah
New Hampshire
Ohio
Colorado
Alaska
Montana
Arizona
West Virginia
Arkansas
Texas
Vermont
Minesota
Wisconsin
Indiana
Delaware
North Carolina
Pennsylvania
Kentucky
Florida
Alabama
Missouri
Louisiana
Oregon
Hawaii
Massachusetts
Illinois
Kansas
Rhode Island
Tennessee
Iowa
Mississippi
Nebraska
California
Washington
Connecticut
New Jersey

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

(State Integrity Investigation, 2012)
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Law and Order: Total and Per Capita Corruption Convictions - The Public
Integrity Section of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Criminal Division compiles and
maintains information related to arrests and convictions of public officials. The total
number of convictions for corruption-related offenses from 1998 – 2007 was compiled in
a 2007 report to Congress (U.S. Department of Justice, 2007) and an article that appeared
in The New York Times (Marsh, 2008, WK3). Convictions were divided by state. The
states were subsequently ranked based upon which state had the highest number of guilty
officials.
Table 3.3, Total Number of Federal Corruption Convictions by State
Rank
1
2
3
4
5 (Tied)
5 (Tied)
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

State
Florida
New York
Texas
Pennsylvania
California
Ohio
Illinois
New Jersey
Louisiana
Virginia
Alabama
Tennessee
Kentucky
Michigan
Mississippi
Massachusetts
North Carolina
Georgia
Missouri
Maryland
Arizona
Indiana
Wisconsin
Connecticut
Oklahoma
Washington
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Convictions 1998 – 2007
824
704
565
555
547
547
502
418
380
332
303
252
242
215
212
188
179
163
158
148
140
123
122
111
107
99

Table 3.3 (Continued)
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34 (Tied)
34 (Tied)
36
37
38
39 (Tied)
39 (Tied)
39 (Tied)
42
43
44
45
46
47 (Tied)
47 (Tied)
49
50

Arkansas
Colorado
West Virginia
South Carolina
Minnesota
Montana
North Dakota
Alaska
Hawaii
Nevada
Delaware
South Dakota
Idaho
Kansas
Utah
Oregon
Iowa
New Mexico
Rhode Island
Maine
New Hampshire
Wyoming
Vermont
Nebraska
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2007)

80
77
74
73
66
59
53
51
51
46
44
41
38
38
38
36
35
30
26
25
14
14
13
12

Topping the list with 824 convictions between 1998 and 2007 was Florida. Next
was New York with 704 for the same time period with Texas and Pennsylvania a distant
third and fourth with 565 and 555 convictions respectively. By this measure, Florida was
the most politically corrupt state in the United States for this time period. Conversely, the
state with the lowest number of convictions was Nebraska with 12 followed by Vermont
in 49th place with 13, and Wyoming and New Hampshire tied for 47th least corrupt with
14 convictions each (U.S. Department of Justice, 2007).
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These rankings aside, the nature of the crimes of which these public officials and
others involved with corrupt activities were convicted requires illumination. If the Florida
Citrus Commission could bravely declare that orange juice “isn’t just for breakfast,
anymore” (Stoneback, 1984), a fitting slogan for political corruption would be that it’s
not just bribery anymore. A common conception of political corruption is the bribe: a
simple payment for a quid pro quo from an official. The fact of the matter is that political
corruption, particularly in a developed nation, is a sophisticated enterprise consisting of a
wide variety of crimes of which few citizens could conceive. In its 2007 report, the
Public Integrity Section highlights a wide variety of offenses – including many that are
simply beyond the scope and jurisdiction of Florida’s statutes. Because these convictions
could include interstate and international offenses carried out by people who were
convicted of crimes within a particular state, violations of federal elections laws, and
issues where the U.S. Attorney is the prosecutor with primary jurisdiction, it is an
imprecise measure of corruption within any particular state. For these reasons, it is even
more important to consider this measure in conjunction with other state rankings for
political corruption.

Returning once again to rankings based upon convictions for corruption offenses
we are reminded that not all offenses are created equal nor does one conviction
necessarily equal another when ranking states. In order to standardize this data, it is
necessary to evaluate the total number offenses on a per capita basis. When considering
offenses on a per capita basis (Marsh, 2008, WK3), the “most” and “least” corrupt states
are radically different.
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Table 3.4, Per Capita Number of Federal Corruption Convictions by State
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 (Tied)
8 (Tied)
10 (Tied)
10 (Tied)
12
13
14 (Tied)
14 (Tied)
16 (Tied)
16 (Tied)
18
19
20
21
22 (Tied)
22 (Tied)
24 (Tied)
24 (Tied)
24 (Tied)
27
28
29 (Tied)
29 (Tied)
31
32 (Tied)
32 (Tied)
32 (Tied)
32 (Tied)
36
37 (Tied)
37 (Tied)
39
40
41 (Tied)
41 (Tied)
41 (Tied)
41 (Tied)
45
46
47
48
49
50

State
North Dakota
Alaska
Louisiana
Mississippi
Montana
Kentucky
Alabama
Delaware
South Dakota
Florida
New Jersey
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Tennessee
Virginia
Hawaii
West Virginia
Illinois
New York
Connecticut
Oklahoma
Arkansas
Massachusetts
Wyoming
Idaho
Missouri
Maryland
Texas
Arizona
Rhode Island
Wisconsin
North Carolina
Michigan
Vermont
Nevada
Indiana
Maine
Georgia
South Carolina
Colorado
Washington
New Mexico
Utah
California
Kansas
Minnesota
Iowa
New Hampshire
Oregon
Nebraska

Annual Convictions Per 1 Mil Residents
8.3
7.9
7.5
7.4
6.4
5.9
5.6
5.4
5.4
4.9
4.9
4.8
4.2
4.2
4.2
4.1
4.1
4.0
3.7
3.2
3.1
3.0
3.0
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.7
2.6
2.5
2.5
2.2
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.0
1.9
1.9
1.8
1.7
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.7

(Marsh, 2008, WJ3)
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As discussed in The New York Times article covering these rankings (Marsh, 2008,
WK3), the per capita approach is especially negative for North Dakota’s image. North
Dakota’s image notwithstanding, the radically different results further underscore
operationalization concerns within corruption research and shows that not all per capita
conviction rates are created equal.

It’s the Perception: Results from a Survey of State Reporters - In 2003, State
Politics & Policy Quarterly published the results of a survey of state government reports
conducted with the goal of gaining information about the perceived corruption in each of
the 50 states (Boylan & Long, 2003). From an epistemological perspective, a survey of
those who cover state politics to determine a relative perception of political corruption
seems a logical approach to the issue. The results of this survey identified Rhode Island,
Louisiana, and New Mexico as the top three most corrupt states and Colorado, North
Dakota, and South Dakota tied for least corrupt.

Table 3.5, Boylan & Long (2003) Survey of Journalists
Rank

State

1
2
3
4
4
6
7
8
8
10
10
12
13
14
15

Rhode Island
Louisiana
New Mexico
Oklahoma
Delaware
Alabama
Kentucky
Arizona
West Virginia
Illinois
Ohio
Connecticut
Pennsylvania
Utah
Maryland
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Reporters’ Scores
(Out of 7)
5.500
5.400
5.333
5.000
5.000
4.909
4.857
4.714
4.714
4.667
4.667
4.500
4.455
4.333
4.052

Table 3.5 (Continued)
16
16
16
16
20
21
22
22
22
22
26
27
28
29
29
29
29
33
34
34
36
37
38
39
40
41
41
41
44
45
45
45

Hawaii
Indiana
Mississippi
New York
Missouri
Arkansas
Georgia
South Carolina
Nevada
Florida
North Carolina
California
Tennessee
Texas
Alaska
Wyoming
Washington
Michigan
Virginia
Nebraska
Wisconsin
Idaho
Kansas
Iowa
Montana
Minnesota
Vermont
Oregon
Maine
Colorado
South Dakota
North Dakota

4.000
4.000
4.000
4.000
3.692
3.667
3.500
3.500
3.500
3.500
3.471
3.333
3.250
3.000
3.000
3.000
3.000
2.958
2.667
2.667
2.600
2.500
2.429
2.250
2.143
2.000
2.000
2.000
1.667
1.500
1.500
1.500

(Boylan & Long, 2003)

The survey is a natural response to the concern that corruption is an untraceable
(Belinsky, 2009) behavior without a solid set of criteria. There also exists the possibility,
known only to local journalists, that certain anti-corruption activities are in fact
politically motivated methods for eliminating political competition (Duhamel, 2004).
Additionally, local journalists may be the best source of information in cities with a
heavily entrenched power structure (Trounstine, 2008). However, a criticism of this
approach – or the survey audience in particular, is the journalists’ close proximity to the
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political actors about whom they are being surveyed. While journalists are nominally
neutral in the process and expected to provide an unbiased response concerning relative
corruption in their home state, they may not be as unbiased as one is led to believe
(Foerstel, 2001). A notable example of a lack of journalistic neutrality was the decision of
NewsMax, a publication with a Tallahassee reporter who could have been included in this
corruption perception survey, to endorse and contribute $100,000.00 to the campaign of
Florida Governor Rick Scott (R-FL) (Krepel, 2011). The idea of a news publication
endorsing and working to elect a partisan candidate while simultaneously providing news
coverage of the campaign potentially casts a chilling shadow over the validity of surveys
involving political journalists.

E Pluribus Unum: Consolidating Approaches, the Meta-Study

Each model for ranking the states based on political corruption brings certain
advantages and disadvantages. The State Integrity Investigation is overly focused on
institutions and maintains an overt advocacy role in states in which it has a presence,
measures and rankings of states based on total and per capita corruption convictions also
fail to take into account population (in the case of total convictions) and externalities such
as special investigations, enhanced enforcement, or other activities that may temporarily
increase the number of corruption convictions (this applies to both the total and per capita
rankings), while the journalist poll is subjective and based upon the perception of the
reporters who responded. Taking these issues into consideration, it is logical to
consolidate these rankings into a single ranking that takes into account all four
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approaches to ranking states. Each of these studies covers concurrent time periods, cover
all states (except for the journalist poll, which omits Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
New Jersey), and analyze the same subject along different lines. Averaging the results of
all four studies, one can derive a more accurate reflection of corruption across all 50
states. The strength of this approach is that it takes into consideration both the total and
per capita conviction rates in all 50 states – effectively mitigating concerns over
disproportionately high overall convictions and disproportionately low per capita rates.
An averaged ranking also accounts for the anticorruption institutions analyzed by the
State Integrity Investigation and the perceptions of the journalists’ poll. Based upon
readily available data, an average ranking is possibly the most accurate reflection of
comparative corruption among the 50 American states.

Table 3.5, Averaged Rankings
State
Ohio
Louisiana
New York
Kentucky
Alabama
Pennsylvania
Virginia
Oklahoma
Florida
Maryland
West Virginia
Illinois
Delaware
Georgia
Arizona
Mississippi
Alaska
Texas
Michigan

Integrity
Investigation
17
36
14
32
34
31
4
13
33
11
22
40
29
1
21
45
19
24
7

Per Capita
Convictions
12
3
19
6
7
13
14
21
10
27
16
18
8
37
29
4
2
28
32

Total
Convictions
5
9
2
13
11
4
10
25
1
20
29
7
37
18
21
15
34
3
14
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Journalists

Total Average

10
2
16
7
6
13
34
4
22
15
8
10
4
22
8
16
29
29
33

11
12.5
12.75
14.5 (Tied)
14.5 (Tied)
15.25
15.5
15.75
16.5
18.25
18.75 (Tied)
18.75 (Tied)
19.5 (Tied)
19.5 (Tied)
19.75
20
21 (Tied)
21 (Tied)
21.5

New
Ranking
1
2
3
4 (Tied)
4 (Tied)
6
7
8
9
10
11 (Tied)
11 (Tied)
13 (Tied)
13 (Tied)
15
16
17 (Tied)
17 (Tied)
19

Table 3.5 (Continued)
North Dakota
New Jersey
South Dakota
Arkansas
Montana
Tennessee
South Carolina
Missouri
Nevada
New Mexico
Indiana
Massachusetts
Wyoming
Hawaii
Connecticut
North Carolina
Utah
Idaho
Rhode Island
Wisconsin
California
Colorado
Maine
Washington
Minnesota
Vermont
New Hampshire
Kansas
Oregon
Iowa
Nebraska

8
50
2
23
20
43
6
35
9
12
28
39
3
38
49
30
15
10
42
27
47
18
5
48
26
25
16
41
37
44
46

1
10
8
22
5
14
39
24
32
41
36
22
24
16
20
32
41
25
29
31
41
40
37
41
46
32
48
45
49
47
50

33
8
38
27
32
12
30
19
36
44
22
16
47
34
24
17
39
39
45
23
5
28
46
26
31
49
47
39
42
43
50

45
N/A
45
21
40
28
22
20
22
3
16
N/A
29
16
12
26
14
37
1
36
27
45
44
29
41
41
N/A
38
41
39
34

21.75
22.66666667
23.25 (Tied)
23.25 (Tied)
24.25 (Tied)
24.25 (Tied)
24.25 (Tied)
24.5
24.75
25
25.5
25.66666667
25.75
26
26.25 (Tied)
26.25 (Tied)
27.25
27.75
29.25 (Tied)
29.25 (Tied)
30
32.75
33
36 (Tied)
36 (Tied)
36.75
37
40.75
42.25
43.25
45

20
21
22 (Tied)
22 (Tied)
24 (Tied)
24 (Tied)
24 (Tied)
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34 (Tied)
34 (Tied)
36
37
38 (Tied)
38 (Tied)
40
41
42
43 (Tied)
43 (Tied)
45
46
47
48
49
50

This approach of averaging the other four ranking models allows a researcher to control
for disproportionately high total convictions, for population via the per capita ranking, for
strong state anti-corruption institutions evaluated by the State Integrity Investigation, and
for the perception of political journalists. All states are issued a respective rank – 1 being
the most corrupt, 50 being the least corrupt, and sorted based upon their average rank.
This approach identifies consistently high corruption indicators and comes with a new
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“most corrupt” state, Ohio and stronger evidence of Nebraska being the perceived “least
corrupt” state in the United States. But what does this mean? The approach of averaging a
wide swatch of comparative corruption indicators shows not only do states need to
further prioritize political corruption as a public policy issue, but also that primarily
qualitative data sources concerning corruption can produce a provable, precise measure
of a state’s level of corruption relative to the other states.
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CHAPTER FOUR - CORRUPTION IN FLORIDA

Statistical measures and surveys of perceived political corruption can only
provide a limited view into a particular state. Gaining an insight into the cultural and
political contexts of a particular state can enable researchers and reformers to target
reforms that are not only beneficial, but also practical initiatives that stand a real chance
of implementation. A rigorous, case-based analysis of a state can also reveal more
information about the causes, motivations, and incentives of corrupt actors in a way
unobtainable through quantitative measures and other indices (Andersson and Bergman,
2009). Still another reason for an in-depth review of Florida’s experience with political
corruption is the maturity of its democracy and well-established institutions. As a state in
the lone remaining superpower in the world, Florida occupies a position of democracy
and development to which many nations strive. Since Florida still grapples with questions
of real and perceived political corruption, the exploration of successful strategies here are
just as important as they might be in one of the more corrupt nations. Finally, analyzing a
single subdivision of a state (i.e. Florida) allows researchers to review instances of
corruption in a way not available to strict comparative researchers and work to better
understand the relationship between economic growth and political corruption,
particularly the question of whether corruption reduces growth or if growth reduces
corruption (Brown and Shackman, 2007).
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There are several internal and external approaches to implementing reform within
a state, but none are possible without a deep perspective of the landscape. Among the
many considerations for reformers is to what extent heretofore corrupt actors will be
included in a new system, who will become part of a reform-based coalition, and what, if
any, aspects of the former system should be preserved (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). To this
end, we will be discussing Florida’s current approach to political corruption in its laws.
Then, assuming the perspective of an international nongovernmental organization, we
will analyze Florida’s anti-corruption institutions within Transparency International’s
National Integrity System (2000) model. By delving deeper into Florida’s perspective on
this issue, we apply the lessons of definition and operationalization of political corruption
and anti-corruption approaches to existing institutions.

Statutes Chapter 838 – Criminalized Corruption

A fundamental premise of the American system of democracy is the notion that
the elected official is elected from among the people and acts in their best interests as the
representative of the people. The trust placed on the person elected to hold office, to vote
on how tax dollars are spent, to set the priorities of the government is a burden that
should be stressed and remain foremost in the minds of elected officials. However, this is
often not the case and elected officials will act in their own self-interest and the interests
of those family, friends, and other supporters – often to the detriment of those for whom
they were elected to serve. While Florida has glaringly obvious weaknesses with regard
to laws making corrupt behavior illegal, it also has strong institutions created in response
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to specific scandals that serve as a strong counter to actors who may wish to pursue their
own agenda. However, it is significant to note that much of the perceived corruption in
the American democratic system is related to the improper influence of money in politics.
Described as an “influence market,” politicians within this system accept legal campaign
contributions with the contributor buying access rather than a specific vote or outcome
(Johnston, 2005). Florida fits into this category, as we will see from the case of former
Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, Ray Sansom.

Concerns over the issue of political corruption in Florida come up on a regular
basis and have been examined at great length by the government itself. We will discuss
two such governmental studies: the 1999 report by the Public Corruption Study
Commission requested by former Governor Jeb Bush and the report of the Nineteenth
Statewide Grand Jury convened in 2010 at the request of then Governor Charlie Crist.
The Public Corruption Study Commission was made up of fifteen elected and appointed
officials along with members of concerned entities such as the Florida Commission on
Ethics and other political organizations (Public Corruption Study Commission, 1999).
Taken together, these two state reports clearly outline the problem of political corruption
in Florida, propose solutions to this problem, and do so in a clear, concise manner.

This line of thought leads us to wonder: just what are Florida’s anti-corruption
laws? Pursuant to Florida State Statutes, Title XLVI, Chapter 838 relates to criminalized
political corruption. In Florida, the only criminalized political behaviors are related to
bribery or improperly influencing of a public servant for personal gain (whether the
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offender is a public servant receiving this benefit or the person attempting to influence
said public servant). The question of just what constitutes a public servant is defined in
Florida Statute 838.014(6) (2012) thusly:
(6)

“Public servant” means:
(a) Any officer or employee of a state, county, municipal, or special
district agency or entity;
(b) Any legislative or judicial officer or employee;
(c) Any person, except a witness, who acts as a general or special
magistrate, receiver, auditor, arbitrator, umpire, referee, consultant,
or hearing officer while performing a governmental function; or
(d) A candidate for election or appointment to any of the positions listed
in this subsection, or an individual who has been elected to, but has
yet to officially assume the responsibilities of, public office.

The definition we find in today’s Florida Statutes is not without controversy. The 2010
Statewide Grand Jury Study on Corruption recommended that this definition be far
broader, suggesting these changes:
a.

Amend F.S. 838.014(6)(a) to read: “Any officer or employee of a
governmental entity.”
b. Create F.S. 838.014(6)(e) to state:
“Any officer, director, partner, manager, representative, or employee of a
nongovernmental entity, private corporation, quasi-public corporation,
quasi-public entity or anyone covered under chapter 119 that is authorized
by law or contract to perform a governmental function or provide a
governmental service on behalf of the state, county, municipal, or special
district agency or entity to the extent that the individual’s conduct relates
to the performance of the governmental function or provision of the
governmental service.”
“‘Governmental function’ or ‘governmental service’ for purposes of
Chapter 838 means performing a function or serving a governmental
purpose which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate
governmental unit or which is demonstrated to perform a function or serve
a purpose which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of
public funds.”
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The explanation for these changes is that the current definition of a public servant has not
kept pace with the nature of the offenses for which the statute was written. The 2010
Grand Jury Report (p. 19-22) goes so far as the provide the examples of a private
company providing a government service that was contracted by a nonprofit corporation
that directly receives federal, state, and local tax dollars to execute its services. In the
example, officers of the private company rigged bids, accepted bribes, and engaged in
nepotism. However, the offenders could not be charged under Florida’s corruption statute
because they were not considered public servants under the statute because the law does
not apply to any person not directly employed by a governmental entity. This concern
was echoed in several other examples provided by the Grand Jury’s report: employees of
nonprofit corporations contracted by the state falsifying community service hours for
felons on probation, the ability of prisoners to bribe guards at privatized state prisons
because the guards are not “technically” government employees, and bribing contracted
home inspectors to find a house up to code in advance of a sale. Taken all together, there
are glaringly wide-open loopholes in what constituted bribery under Florida’s state laws.
For this reason, redefining the definition of public servant was the “first and most critical
recommendation” of the Grand Jury (Nineteenth Statewide Grand Jury Report, 2010, p.
17). The Grand Jury also recommends another simple change to Chapter 838 in which the
concept of acting “with corrupt intent” is replaced with “intentionally” (p. 23). This
would allow prosecutors a lower legal threshold for establishing that a public servant
intentionally acted to misuse their office. The members of the Grand Jury believe that
these actions would result in easier prosecution of crimes that would meet a layperson’s
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interpretation of political corruption – crimes that cannot currently be prosecuted under
the current statute as it is written.

Insofar as the state level consequences of corrupt behaviors, all offenses in the
corruption statute are considered third degree felonies, with the exception of bribery,
which is a second degree felony. As such, the maximum punishment for a first time
offender convicted of a single third degree felony in Florida is “a term of imprisonment
not exceeding 5 years,” a fine not to exceed $5,000.00 (Florida Statutes 775.082(d), 2012
and 775.083(1)(c), 2012). This is a seemingly harsh punishment fitting a simple crime,
but one should take into consideration another of Florida’s criminal penalties, Statute
775.087 or the 10-20-Life law – the possession of a handgun during the commission of a
violent felony. A fundamental premise of the 10-20-Life mandatory minimum sentences
is the common notion that a penalty for a crime can be so severe that it serves as a
deterrent to commit a crime. This line of reasoning can be found with the use of the death
penalty as a punishment for certain sexual assaults and drug traffickers. The same
justification appears in the recommendations of the 1999 Florida Public Corruption Study
Commission Report and the 2010 Statewide Grand Jury Report on Corruption when both
bodies urged the Governor and State Legislature to amend the corruption statute to make
all offenses related to the misuse of public office a second degree felony – thus increasing
the minimum length of prison sentences from five to fifteen years and doubling the
maximum fine from $5,000.00 to $10,000.00.
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To summarize the effectiveness of Florida’s criminal laws against public
corruption, it can be widely assumed that they are not effective for a wide swath of
corruption actions. This is particularly true when there is a privatized corporation
involved in the performance of a government function (such as a privatized state prison),
as employees and those controlling these enterprises are not considered public servants
under the law. Such is the case: they are largely exempt from the corruption statute by
virtue of the statute’s outdated definitions. This is not to say that a person defrauding the
state government is not simply exempt from any negative consequences of their corrupt
enterprises, but rather that the state cannot refer to the crimes as political corruption. A
person who defrauds the state can be charged with a wide range of crimes such as theft,
fraud, or racketeering – thus rendering crimes against the state and its citizens as being no
different from a crime against another corporation and its stockholders. Corrupt actors are
also subject to federal laws and prosecution – which cover a far wider scope of offenses
than state laws. Federal prosecutors are capable of prosecuting crimes that cross state and
national boundaries, exceed the scope of state laws, and involve federal officials. Federal
elected officials such as members of the House of Representatives and Senators are
subject to federal jurisdiction and also to Congressional Ethics Committees, which are
empowered to remove them from office.

Florida Statutes Chapter 112, Part III – The Code of Ethics

Florida State Statutes Chapter 112, Part III is also known as the Florida Code of
Ethics for Public Officers and Employees. The Code of Ethics provides information to
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Florida’s public servants about their duties and obligations to disclose certain information
and also what actions are prohibited once they accept a position as a public servant in the
state. The enforcement body for the Code of Ethics is the Florida Commission on Ethics
– an administrative enforcement body composed of nine commissioners appointed to
two-year terms. The Governor appoints five commissioners with the remaining four
commissioners appointed by the Senate President and the Speaker of the Florida House
of Representatives. Furthermore, not more than five of the nine members of the
commission can belong to the same political party. The Commission on Ethics was
created in 1974 with the passage of the Florida Government in the Sunshine Amendment,
which also replaced the criminal enforcement of the offenses shown in the Code of Ethics
with the administrative enforcement of the Commission on Ethics. Additionally, the
Commission does not have the authority to unilaterally launch an investigation of
suspected political corruption, instead relying on citizen complaints before being
permitted to take any action (Commission on Ethics, 2013). The Code of Ethics itself is
primarily concerned with outlining prohibited solicitation of compensation from public
servants, lobbying rules, and misuse of one’s public position. It also includes the
requirement for regular disclosure of conflicts of interest and financial disclosures –
which are also maintained by the Commission on Ethics (Commission on Ethics, 2013).

Florida Evaluated Through the National Integrity System Lens

Beyond state statutes, Florida has other institutions and safeguards dedicated to
combating public corruption, or at least perform a mission associated with this goal.
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Speaking generally, Florida’s political reform efforts have been a direct response to
scandals or serious threats to an existing status quo – whether judicial corruption
(Dyckman, 2008), a response to racial strife (Warren, 2008), a reapportionment crisis
(Karl, 2010, p. 143-146), or widespread demographic and partisan shifts (Colburn, 2007).
There are many checks and balances within Florida’s government that prevent or at least
deter corruption. To analyze these checks and balances within Florida’s institutions, we
will be using Transparency International’s National Integrity System to determine how
Florida fares when held up to an ‘ideal’ institution-based state model typically used to
rank nations. We will also review some updates that may be appropriate to the National
Integrity System when using it, or a similar model, for analyzing political subdivisions
within a country (i.e. each state in the United States).

One can easily see that these common sense institutional reforms could result in a
lower level of political corruption and can be applied to any state. To this end, we have
applied this model to Florida’s political institutions. In our examination of Florida’s
political system, one will see that Transparency International’s National Integrity System
model may be lacking in several key areas. Despite having established strong institutions
reflective of those in Transparency International’s National Integrity System model,
Florida is a state dominated by single-party rule in which instances of political corruption
and influence peddling are quite frequent. In the National Integrity System model
provided by Transparency International, it is quite apparent that the model is designed to
benefit every country wishing to further strengthen its defenses against political
corruption and to make corruption a “high risk, low reward” enterprise (Transparency
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International, 2000). As a state within a superpower, it is logical to apply this model to
Florida in order to test the hypothesis that they will be successful as a nation develops.

On its face, Florida is an excellent test subject for this model as it meets or exceeds
all of the pillars established by National Integrity System, has strong institutions, and a
high quality of life (as compared to many other countries). In this analysis, we will look
at how each of Florida’s institutions fits within the National Integrity System model
beginning with the executive branch of Florida’s government, the state’s governor. In the
TI Sourcebook 2000, the key facets of executive branch reforms include placing an
emphasis on the leadership of the individual executive, a detached relationship with the
state’s judiciary, the need to simultaneously lead the civil service without exerting
excessive political influence upon it, the personal gifts and legal privileges afforded to the
executive, and the role of the executive in preparing the state’s budget (Transparency
International, 2000).

Keeping these factors in mind, the first pillar in the National Integrity System (the
executive), the governor of Florida’s office meets these requirements with few notable
exceptions. Over time, the ‘bully pulpit’ of executive leaders within the United States has
only grown and there is much emphasis placed on the opinions and statements of
executive political leaders. This phenomenon is hardly new as there is an extensive
record of aggressive executive leadership from Florida’s governors. Examples include
former Governor LeRoy Collins speaking out against desegregation and participating in
the Selma, Alabama march as a representative of the federal government (Dyckman,
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2006). Another example is former Governor Reubin O’D. Askew successfully leading a
statewide referendum to implement a corporate income tax for Florida (Dyckman, 2011).
Florida has a long history of listening when its governor endorses and campaigns for a
particular initiative. Continuing on, the governor’s relationship with the judiciary is
limited only to the appointment of judges who have been approved by the Florida Bar
Association’s nonpartisan Judicial Nominating Commission that solicits potential
nominees, weighs their qualifications, and presents a list of between three and six names
to the governor (Statutes & Constitution, 1998). After nominations have been made, the
new Supreme Court of Florida or District Court of Appeals justice is subject to a
quadrennial retention vote. Insofar as the governor’s relationship with the state’s civil
service, the state’s bureaucracy is operated under a strong cabinet system (The Governor
and Cabinet, 2010) composed of the Governor (who serves as chairman), the state’s
Attorney General, Chief Financial Officer, and the Commissioner of Agriculture and
Consumer Services (The Governor and Cabinet, 2010). All of these officials are
independently elected and have a vote equal to that of the governor with the exception of
the governor’s ability to cast a tie-breaking vote (The Governor and Cabinet, 2010).
Given this arrangement, the governor of Florida has significantly less influence over the
state’s bureaucracy than many other similarly situated elected officials in the United
States and elsewhere. Taking into consideration the governor’s limited relationship with
the state’s judiciary including a merit-based nomination system and a power-sharing
arrangement with the state’s bureaucracy, one could argue that Florida exceeds the
suggested institutional checks on a state’s executive found in the National Integrity
System.
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The second pillar in the National Integrity System is the legislative branch of
government. The TI Sourcebook provides a number of indicators for evaluating the
effectiveness of the legislative branch as a pillar within the National integrity System
with the overarching theme of the legislative branch serving as an effective check against
the power of the executive, conflict of interest laws, separation of the legislative and
judicial branches, concerns about the fairness of elections, and finally the legislatures role
as an equal in the state’s budgetary processes (Transparency International, 2000). In a
general sense, the answer to whether or not Florida has strict laws against conflicts of
interest and personal gain of elected officials is a resounding yes. Using one’s position as
an elected official for direct personal gain while in office (personal enrichment, a higherpaying job, etc) is seen as serious breach of ethics and applicable federal laws. However,
there are many openings for behaviors that, while not illegal, can be perceived as
conflicts of interest. For example, while in office, former Speaker of the Florida House of
Representatives Ray Sansom has been indicted on charges of using his office for personal
gain (Leary, 2009). This action resulted in his resignation from the top leadership
position in the Florida House of Representatives under the immediate threat of removal
by members of his own political party and his subsequent resignation from the Florida
House prior to the beginning of his trial (Leary, 2010). Ultimately the charges were
dropped with no criminal consequences for Sansom, which further underscores the need
for stronger conflict of interest laws in Florida.

On the issues related to political campaigns, the Florida Legislature meets or
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exceeds all of the requirements placed upon it by the National Integrity System. Florida
has fair, democratic elections, the Florida Elections Commission monitors campaign and
political party contributions and expenditures, and the media typically exposes those
involved with improper fundraising activities. An issue on which the TI Sourcebook is
silent is the matter of political gerrymandering. Florida has a long history of using the
reapportionment process to preserve existing power structures (Colburn, 2007). Districts
for the Florida State Senate and the Florida House of Representatives are deliberately
designed to benefit the party in control of the state, in this case the Republican Party
(FairDistrictsFlorida.org, n.d.) (Wagner and Prier, 2008). Through the creation of a
number of “majority minority” (Dye, et al., 2008) districts that support the election of a
member of an ethnic minority in the name of providing additional advantages to
minorities within Florida, the Republican Party has been able to build districts so
favorable to Republican incumbents as to result in their controlling greater than twothirds of each house of the legislature. This has been done despite the opposition
Democratic Party’s voter registration advantage of more than 560,000 registered voters in
Florida (NVRA Monthly Report Statistics, 2013). Given the extreme nature of
gerrymandering in Florida and the security of the Republican Party’s supermajority in
Florida, a requirement for equitable apportionment of legislative districts should be added
to the National Integrity System. In 2010, the voters of Florida amended the state
constitution to include two provisions requiring that legislative and congressional districts
be drawn in such a manner as to be “compact, contiguous, and support no political party
over another” (FairDistrictsFlorida.org, n.d.). While the implementation of these
measures affected some change in the make-up to Florida’s legislature, it did not affect
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the Republican majority in the House of Representatives. After the 2012 election, it was
seen as an initiative designed to benefit Democratic Party candidates rather than a
candidate reflective of an individual district (Associated Press, 2012).

The third pillar in the National Integrity System is the Public Accounts Committee
of the legislature. Essentially, this would function as an appropriations committee that
would evaluate the budget presented by the executive. Transparency International
suggests that it is a fundamental check on the power of the executive to require the
legislature to review and approve the state’s budget. Florida’s governmental system
requires this, but also provides for an executive check on the appropriations made by the
legislature. Through the use of the line-item veto, the governor is able to provide
oversight for items placed in the budget by the legislature as opposed to those items
proposed by the governor. A line-item veto can be overridden by the legislature, but it
would require a two-thirds majority vote, as would any other piece of legislation subject
to a veto. This illustrates another check on legislative power that is not mentioned in the
National Integrity System. Though, the model does suggest that the chair of the public
accounts committee be a member of the opposition political party or be somebody who is
particularly fair-minded (Transparency International, 2000). Placing a member of the
opposition party as chairperson of the state’s budget committees would indeed be an
intriguing concept to observe and could reduce the amount of frivolous appropriations.

The fourth pillar is that of the auditor-general. This is an entity responsible for
monitoring the use of public monies, that the executive follows the will of the legislature,

57!

and that all measures are taken to ensure that government operates efficiently. The office
would also be responsible for ensuring that the government uses “financial and auditing
procedures designed effectively to reduce the incidence of corruption and increase the
likelihood of its detection” (Transparency International, 2000). Florida’s government
does not have an independent agency solely dedicated to this mission, but there are
several entities that accomplish the same mission intended by the National Integrity
System. While a partisan elected official, the state’s Chief Financial Officer oversees the
state’s Department of Management Services, which provides purchasing and human
resources support to the rest of state government and also audits other state agencies and
projects. As we have seen with the recent “Taj Mahal” courthouse scandal, (Morgan,
2010) the Department of Management Services can be inappropriately influenced by
other political entities, in this case judges and legislative staffers. Though the
inappropriate appropriation happened in 2007, this scandal did not come to light until a
media exposé was published in 2010. This illustrates an area in which the political system
in Florida is lacking potential oversight.

The fifth pillar of the National Integrity System is the public service. Transparency
International (2000) states that civil service should recognize “the accountability of civil
servants to the Minister; the duty of all public officers to discharge public functions
reasonably and according to the law; the duty to comply with the law, including
international law and treaty obligations, and to uphold the administration of justice, and
ethical standards governing particular professions.” Florida’s state employees are rarely
shown to have been corrupt or to have participated in corrupt behavior. The fact that all
of Florida’s public employees are required to disclose all work products and all
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documents under the state’s aggressive “Sunshine Law” has served as a very effective
deterrent to public corruption among civil servants – it may be a very different situation
among elected officials and their immediate staffs. This is particularly true when a
member of the general public or media can request access to every e-mail or phone
record for a public employee (My Florida Sunshine, n.d.). Florida’s expansive Sunshine
Law is another example of the National Integrity System coming up short. Another pillar
dictates that investigative journalism needs to be an essential aspect of a free media, but
only makes passing mention that the government should be required to make available all
possible information to aid in these efforts. In instances of classified or military
documents, the National Integrity System could also suggest a streamlined
declassification process based upon the length of time since the document was first
prepared or classified. While Florida’s government does not have an extensive amount of
top-secret information, it is still important to note that the model should include
awareness of the usefulness of classified documents in providing governmental oversight.
This is especially true in instances of a government participating in or leading clandestine
military or paramilitary operations.

The sixth pillar is perhaps one of the most important and often-discussed aspects of
combating political corruption: the judiciary (Transparency International, 2000). While
there is an abundant discussion about the judiciary in the National Integrity System, this
boils down to only a few key points. The judiciary must effectively serve as a check
against the power of the executive and legislative branches without fear of repercussions,
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it must function as an efficient institution capable of providing fair legal services to the
population in a timely fashion, and citizens must be able to address judicial misconduct
through an institution other than the formal court system. On these issues, Florida’s court
system adequately meets the National Integrity System standard, but it goes well and
above it in ensuring that judicial nominations at the Supreme Court and District Courts of
Appeal levels are based entirely upon the merit of the nominee through the Judicial
Nominating Commission process and also that potential nominees meet a set of basic
requirements. These policies arose from a long line of judicial scandals in Florida
including a justice who ruled in favor of his former law firm (Dyckman, 2008), a judge
resigning abruptly after being filmed on a high-dollar junket to Las Vegas, and a judge
flushing legal documents down his office toilet. Judges in Florida used to also be elected
on a popular partisan basis and this opened the door for judges to behave inappropriately
to reward campaign contributors (Dyckman, 2008). A caution against popular elections
for judicial figures is also an item that fails to appear in the TI Sourcebook. Another item
that is of importance in the TI Sourcebook is the accountability of prosecutors and their
responses to political influence. Transparency International suggests that prosecutors be
subject to a standardized set of published guidelines and also make a determination on
whether or not they should investigate without regard for political influence or
connections on the part of the accused. While Transparency International does make
mention of the need for fair prosecutors, it fails to account for the need for skilled,
capable public defenders. The right of an accused person to be represented at no or low
cost by a qualified attorney is a fundamental right for the citizen of any free and
transparent society and one which Florida provides to its citizens. This underscores yet
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another point in which the National Integrity System is inadequate to its goal of reducing
or eliminating corruption in more developed nations. It would also be worthwhile to
specify that the judiciary have the power of judicial review over the laws and executive
orders of the executive authority within a state.

The seventh pillar of the National Integrity System to be applied to Florida’s
government is a free and independent media. Transparency International (2000) devotes
considerable time to arguing that the media should not be government-owned nor should
it be government-controlled. They also argue that corporate ownership for the media is a
positive attribute of free societies as long as there is competition between corporateowned media outlets. The National Integrity System actually only places priority on the
ability of the media to function without government interference, for competition to exist
between privately-owned media interests, and for a society to support a living wage for
journalists and a means through which journalists can be educated in their craft. Trends in
corporate ownership seem to have damaged transparency and oversight in government
substantially more than they have helped. Some of the most in-depth reporting in Florida
is the result of research conducted by non-profit media entities such as public television
and reports from National Public Radio. In fact, the State Integrity Investigation is a
nonprofit entity supported by groups like Public Radio International (State Integrity
Investigation, n.d.). Entities such as these represent a far more independent media
presence than either state-owned or corporate-owned media outlets. One of the bestknown papers in Florida, the former St. Petersburg Times (now the Tampa Bay Times), is
actually owned by a nonprofit organization, the St. Petersburg Times Fund, Inc. (Tampa
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Bay Times, n.d.). Because non-profit organizations can devote more time and energy to
ensuring a high level of ethics within their ranks without concern for profit-making
enterprises and because they regularly provide a far higher quality news product,
Transparency International should include the need for an independent, non-profit media
estate in its National Integrity Plan. At the very least, it could follow the Florida model
and have a hybrid between corporate-owned and non-profit media organizations reporting
on the state’s government or the British model of government-supported media and
privately owned media coexisting.

The eighth pillar in this system is related to civil society. Transparency
International (2000) defines civil society as all actors within a political system that are
not governmental in nature nor are they business interests. Examples discussed include
chambers of commerce, nongovernmental organizations, sports clubs, and other informal
groups of citizens. It does not include the actor on an individual level. What this pillar
comes down to is the need for members of society to be able to organize without
excessive governmental interference. Also discussed is the need for a standardized
procedure for the licensure of professionals such as accountants, attorneys, and medical
professionals. In Florida, citizens have the right to peaceably assemble and to incorporate
a more formal organization should they wish. Florida also has an extensive licensure
program for nearly all trades and professions. In areas that do not have a state-level
licensing process, Florida defaults to the national organization that provides credentials
(for example, project management professionals, logistics, and aircraft pilots). Perhaps
more importantly, Florida also has the ability to suspend or terminate a professional
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license should the practitioner abuse their position or be found guilty of malpractice (for
medical professionals). It should be noted, however, that while the state has the ability to
forbid a professional from practicing their trade, this is done under the auspices of a
nongovernmental body such as the Florida Medical Association or the Florida Bar
Association. Under circumstances that would ordinarily result in the termination of a
professional license, the state will only act officially if there was a violation of a law not
administered by such a body. For example, a doctor who intentionally kills a patient
would be subject to both termination of their medical license and a criminal inquiry.
Transparency International would be well advised to include within this section a
provision to ensure that professionals are also subject to appropriate sanctions by a
licensing body should the situation so dictate.

The ninth pillar of the National Integrity System is the position of a governmental
ombudsman (Transparency International, 2000). The Transparency International
definition of an ombudsman is an entity outside of the regular governmental power
structure capable of receiving, investigating, and acting upon complaints made by
members of the public concerning an official function. Florida has several institutions
with a similar role, except they are created on an almost ad hoc basis and have a wide
range of names such as Inspector General, the Florida Ethics Commission, hospital
Patient Advocates, etc. Nearly all elected officials function as ombudsmen for the
government as well since constituent services is one of the key responsibilities of an
elected official. In fact, every state legislator has an assistant with the title of Legislative
Assistant whose job description includes a narrative about the need to receive and
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respond to constituent concerns (Legislative Assistant, n.d.). Perhaps this differs from
nation to nation, but one frequently sees the action of a person functioning in the role of
an ombudsman on behalf of citizens. Media outlets will investigate complaints from
citizens and consumers, elected officials will also do so, and appointed state employees
will also perform this function. While these individuals and institutions lack the ability to
levy sanctions upon those who have failed to provide a service or maliciously performed
a service, they can remedy the situation nonetheless. Perhaps a better description of this
section would be the idea that every person in government should function as an
ombudsman. The need for a separate agency is debatable. This is especially true in a
developing nation. In the case of Florida, there is an aggressive emphasis in redressing
the actual and perceived shortcomings of the state government. It should also be noted
that nearly all government entities are subject to investigations from a Fraud, Waste, and
Abuse hotline through which citizens can report misappropriation of government funds
and equipment along with the ability to report government abuse.

The tenth pillar is the anti-corruption or watchdog agency (Transparency
International, 2000). This pillar is quite simple to define and explain. In order to reduce
the political corruption of a given state, it is essential to have a formal apparatus in place
to combat such corruption. Transparency International suggests that this be accomplished
through the use of a centralized governmental institution. In the case of Florida, it should
be noted that the state is structured in such a manner as to have overlapping layers of both
law enforcement and judicial authority in place to investigate and combat political
corruption. Generally the state’s Florida Department of Law Enforcement handles
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investigations related to corruption, a statewide law enforcement entity established to
provide broad investigatory services to agencies providing law enforcement services to
Florida’s political subdivisions along with roles related to statewide law enforcement
issues. Obviously this approach would not work within a governmental system where the
only source of law enforcement service is a single, national police force, but the
separation of agencies to the most local level proves to be a beneficial scheme in
combating corruption. It should be noted that law enforcement agencies, like anticorruption agencies, are themselves corruptible. To this end, the Florida Department of
Law Enforcement can be investigated by a number of external entities such as a grand
jury or a special prosecutor appointed by the Florida legislature. In the event of a clearcut case of political corruption in which additional investigation is not needed, the
governor has the power to unilaterally remove elected officials from office and appoint a
replacement for the remainder of a term of office or to call a special election. In the event
of political or police corruption within a local government, a city would be investigated
by a county sheriff’s office or by the appropriate State Attorney’s Office and in the event
of corruption at the level of a State Attorney or County Sheriff, the official would be
investigated by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Essentially, there are
overlapping lines of anti-corruption enforcement through out all levels of Florida
government including the internal investigatory body of the legislature itself, the Ethics
Committee (Florida House of Representatives, n.d.). Should there be a concern of
political corruption at the level of the state cabinet or the governor’s office, an
investigation could be launched by the legislature, which also has the ability to remove a
sitting governor from office through an impeachment proceeding. Transparency
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International (2000) specifically asks whether the governor or state executive is within
the jurisdiction of the anti-corruption agency, a scheme that presents challenges. One
would think that an ideal arrangement would be for another branch of government to
have jurisdiction over concerns of political corruption from the very top of the executive
branch. Keeping this in mind, it would be appropriate for the National Integrity System to
be updated to include the suggestion that a legislative branch ought to have the power to
investigate and act upon corruption from the executive branch should it so deem
appropriate. Another issue that should be included in the National Integrity System is a
suggestion against a centralized police force or, at the very least, a police force controlled
by the central government. The unity of all law enforcement activities within a state
could also produce the unintended consequence of the unity of all law enforcement
corruption.

The eleventh and second-to-last pillar in the National Integrity System concerns the
private sector within a particular state (Transparency International, 2000). The essential
message in this pillar from Transparency International is that a country’s private sector
should not be involved in nor should it facilitate political corruption. They are also
especially concerned with the relative amount of competition within a country’s
economy. This fits with the essential idea that capitalist economies produce the least
amount of political corruption. In Florida’s case, there are sectors of the private economy
in which cartels exist, sectors in which political corruption occurs through the use of legal
political activity in favor of those who support a company or sector’s economic goals,
and there are sectors in which this behavior does not occur. One drawback of Florida’s
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laws on political activity is that a particular policy or law can be bought through fully
legal methods. For example, if an entire town’s economy is dominated by one
corporation who employs all of its citizens, the elected bodies will do far more to
accommodate the interests of this company over those of citizens or competing interests.
In Florida, such companies include the U.S. Sugar Corporation, the St. Joe Paper
Company, and the Disney Corporation. In a bit of Devil’s advocate, what happens if one
of these companies decides that it wants to ignore the laws of a government, but does so
by having the law changed? While it may be legal, is it corrupt? For the sake of the
National Integrity System, it would probably be best limited to the scope of governmental
institutions. Alternatively, the principles of a modified National Integrity System can be
modified and applied to private corporations in the form of contracts and other binding
corporate codes of conduct. However, this is beyond the scope of this discussion.

The twelfth and final pillar of the National Integrity System concerns corruption on
the part of international actors (Transparency International, 2000). There are two primary
concerns set forward by Transparency International in this pillar. The first is whether an
international body is using its influence or funds to expand or further facilitate corruption.
The second is whether the international community that will then interact with the state in
a non-corrupt manner is recognizing a legitimate government. Because Florida’s dealings
with the international community are limited based upon its nature as a political
subdivision of the United States, discussion on this point cannot be fully accomplished.
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Case Studies of Political Corruption in Florida

While it may be disconcerting for a voter to find that their representatives
systemically skew their districts to present an electoral advantage (Fair Districts, n.d.),
doing so is not against the law in Florida. This situation underscores a critical issue in
Florida’s political system, the need for clear definition of and test for determining if
certain actions constitute corruption – ala “if it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and
quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck.” As a matter of public policy, Florida has a
very strong code of ethics for public officials and a Commission on Ethics with the power
to investigate and fine elected officials for breaches of the Code of Ethics, as long as it
receives a citizen complaint. (Commission on Ethics, 2010) Once this has happened, it
also uses a bully pulpit to bring attention to cases in which an allegation of corruption is
supported. Florida’s definition aside, the nongovernmental organization Transparency
International (n.d.) defines “corruption” thusly:

Corruption is operationally defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private
gain. TI further differentiates between "according to rule" corruption and "against
the rule" corruption. Facilitation payments, where a bribe is paid to receive
preferential treatment for something that the bribe receiver is required to do by
law, constitute the former. The latter, on the other hand, is a bribe paid to obtain
services the bribe receiver is prohibited from providing.
The key element of this definition is the notion of personal gain. To this end, we
will be examining several examples of sustained charges of corruption and cases in which
the appearance – or perception – of personal gain exists without official action or
investigation into charges. Cases have been selected from the last 30 years from within
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Florida politics and cover elected and appointed elected officials at the federal and state
levels. These cases will be used in conjunction with Transparency International’s
National Integrity System to evaluate corruption in Florida’s political system and to make
public policy observations and recommendations. These cases also serve as excellent
examples as to the need for a comprehensive evaluation of political corruption in Florida
and the United States based upon a rigorous, fixed model.

As reported by the Tampa Bay Times in 2009 (Leary, 2009), the first case
examines sustained political corruption in the Florida legislature’s budget process and an
improper relationship between former speaker of the Florida House of Representatives
Ray Sansom (R-Deerfield Beach, Fla.), a wealthy campaign contributor, Jay Odom, and
the President of Northwest Florida State College, Bob Richburg. The three defendants
were indicted on charges of official misconduct related to the construction of a hangar at
the Destin Airport in Sansom’s legislative district. The grand jury report shows that after
repeated attempts to obtain state funding for a new hangar at this airport, Sansom
appropriated funds to the Northwest Florida State College for the purposes of an
“Emergency Operations Center” at the same airport. Willie Meggs, the Leon County
State Attorney prosecuting this case argues that because Odom, who contributed heavily
to Sansom’s political campaigns, could not get this hangar built; he sought to obtain
funds through a different channel. Sansom, who had been hired (without competition) as
Vice President for Development at Northwest Florida State College, consulted with
Richburg and determined that the best avenue for building the hangar was through an
appropriation to the college. All actors in this stood to gain if it were to be successfully
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completed. Odom would gain a hangar, Sansom would gain additional campaign
contributions and a well-paid job at a college, and Richburg would gain Sansom’s
budgetary experience and, perhaps most importantly, his political contacts. This is quite
clearly an abuse of an official position on the part of Sansom and Richburg and a bribe
from Odom. While Odom, Richburg, and Sansom have been indicted twice by grand
juries (once for official misconduct and once for grand theft and larceny), the charges
were stalled in light of appeals from the defendants and charges of prosecutorial
misconduct levied against Jeggs. Ultimately all charges related to this scandal against
Odom and Sansom were dropped. The only consequences of Sansom’s clear misconduct
was his resignation from the Speakership of the Florida House of Representatives and the
loss of his job with Northwest Florida State College. Odom was eventually found guilty
of a crime when he was found to have reimbursed campaign contributors of former
Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee’s presidential campaign – circumventing federal
campaign contribution limits (Morgan, 2013).

Another case of corruption in Florida involves the former federal trial judge (and
current Congressman) Alcee Hastings. As a federal judge, Hastings presided over a case
involving Frank and Thomas Romano, brothers charged and convicted with racketeering.
During the course of the trial, Hastings and a conspirator were alleged to have accepted a
$150,000.00 bribe from representatives of the defendants in exchange for leniency in
sentencing and the return of a number of seized properties of the two men. The criminal
proceedings against Hastings resulted in an acquittal after Hastings’ coconspirator,
William Borders, refused to testify – resulting in a contempt charge and jail time.
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Borders’ unwillingness to testify became an issue when Congress took up Hastings’
impeachment and voted 413-3 in favor of impeaching the judge. The Senate then took up
the case and found Hastings guilty of conspiracy and removed him from office on
October 20, 1989 with a vote of 69-26 (Marcus, 1989). The Senate had the option to
forever ban Hastings from ever seeking federal office, but declined to do so at the time of
his conviction. Hastings later filed litigation challenging his impeachment and arguing
that because he had been found innocent in a criminal court and because he was tried in
front of the Senate Judiciary Committee and not the full U.S. Senate, Congress’ votes and
impeachment were invalid. This issue was later resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Nixon v. United States, 506 US 224 (1993) when it ruled that federal courts have no
jurisdiction over issues of impeachment because the issue is “solely” delegated to the
legislative branch, which makes a binding, final decision (Nixon v. United States
Opinion, 1993). Such is the case, Hastings’ impeachment was upheld and in 1992, he
instead ran for Congress in Florida’s newly created 23rd District. After winning this
election, was sworn into Congress on January 3, 1993 where he serves to present day
(Congressman Hastings Website, n.d.). William Borders, the person convicted of paying
a bribe to (then) Judge Hastings, was given a complete pardon by President Bill Clinton
during his final weeks in office (U.S. Department of Justice, 2001). While Florida’s
government is not in a position to exert rules upon federal officials, the case of Alcee
Hastings is significant for its demonstrative value. The notion that a person can be
impeached from a position of public trust because of accepting a bribe and later again run
for and be elected to public office illustrates the very real need for reform within the
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system and certainly presents a case of perceived corruption for citizens aware of this
case.

The Latin term quid pro quo makes frequent appearances in political science
literature and is considered an essential element of government by consensus. It translates
to “something for something” and is meant to convey the process of logrolling and
compromise in deliberative bodies. For example, a representative from a rural area would
vote in favor of legislation related to urban renewal in exchange for a vote on rural
subsidies from a representative serving an urban area. This behavior allows representative
bodies to carry out much of their business, however similar behavior between political
interests can also lead to the appearance of corruption. Such an appearance of a
seemingly corrupt act presented itself during the 2000 Presidential Election in Florida.
The first of these, involving former Secretary of State Katherine Harris, concerns the
propriety of an elected official responsible for elections actively campaigning for a
candidate subject to their office’s jurisdiction. During the lead-up to the 2000 election,
Harris served as a co-chair for (then) Governor George W. Bush’s presidential campaign
(CNN, 2005) while, at the same time serving as Florida’s top elections official. Florida
has since reduced the size of its elected cabinet and made the Florida Secretary of State
an appointed position (Florida Governor and Cabinet, n.d.). This was not the case in 2000
and there were no prohibitions against Harris actively working in favor of one candidate
when she was responsible for certifying the election. Additionally, once it became
apparent that a manual recount of ballots in 4 counties that lean in favor of Democrats
might result in a Democratic victory, she ordered manual recounts to stop. This was a
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decision overturned by the Florida Supreme Court and later upheld by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Bush v. Gore 538 U.S. 98 (2000). After the 2000 election, Harris completed a
single term as Secretary of State and went on to run for and be elected to represent
Florida’s 24th Congressional District. Harris’ case illustrates the appearance of a conflict
of interest between the partisan political role of an elected official and the official duties
of the same person. Duty and politics are often inextricably linked, but it is necessary to
define and separate them under circumstances such as these. While there is little evidence
of a link between Harris’ performance in the 2000 election and her subsequent election to
Congress, particularly given the lack of any meaningful institutional Republican support
for Harris’ 2006 U.S. Senate campaign (Kaczor, 2006), it presents the appearance that
she was in effect promoted for her decision to stop manual recounts and thus being seen
as ensuring a victory for George W. Bush’s presidential campaign. After her defeat in the
2006 U.S. Senate election, Harris later went on to begin construction of a multimilliondollar estate in Longboat Key, Fla. and to participate in charity work (Heil, 2012).

The issue of the appearance of corruption or potential improper dealings is a key
threat to public perceptions of Florida’s political system. Some such cases can be minor
in nature and not result in any official action while others are examples of actual
corruption or improper behavior. The cases outlined in this section have not resulted in
any official action to date nor is there any indication that they have resulted in an official
complaint or investigation by either the Florida Commission on Ethics or any
enforcement agency related to the subject, the relationship, or the action. However, this
being said cases such as the following serve as evidence and justification of the need for a
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more thorough understanding of corruption in Florida and further guidance and
legislation related to the issue.

A case that presents a questionable appearance concerns Florida’s current U.S.
Senator, Bill Nelson. An experienced elected official, Senator Nelson began his career
with three terms in the Florida House of Representatives, six terms representing Florida
in Congress, and Florida Treasurer (a position since modified and renamed Chief
Financial Officer) (Florida Department of Financial Services Organization, n.d.). During
his time in Congress, Senator Nelson served as the chair of the Space Subcommittee of
the Science, Space and Technology Committee, which describes its role thusly:

“The Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics has legislative jurisdiction
and general oversight and investigative authority on all matters relating to
astronautical and aeronautical research and development including: national space
policy, including access to space; sub-orbital access and applications; National
Aeronautics and Space Administration and its contractor and governmentoperated labs; space commercialization, including the commercial space activities
relating to the Department of Transportation and the Department of Commerce;
exploration and use of outer space; international space cooperation; the National
Space Council; space applications, space communications and related matters;
earth remote sensing policy; civil aviation research, development, and
demonstration; research, development, and demonstration programs of the Federal
Aviation Administration; and space law.” (Subcommittee on Space, n.d.)

While serving as chair of this subcommittee, Nelson had the occasion to fly to
space aboard the Space Shuttle Columbia as part of NASA’s STS-61-C mission. Nelson
completed extensive NASA training at government expense prior to his flight and was an
active crewmember as payload specialist (Nelson & Buckingham, 1988). The opportunity
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to fly in space would certainly be an exciting adventure and something very few people
would turn down. From a political perspective, however, it presents a troubling
appearance and too close a relationship between the chair of an oversight committee and
the federal agency he is responsible for overseeing. While it is quite common for elected
officials to ride aboard military aircraft while in a similar capacity over the Department of
Defense or patronize a national park while overseeing the Department of the Interior,
spaceflight adds a dimension to this dilemma and raises concerns over the separation
between the executive and legislative branches of government along with what may very
well be the most expensive Congressional junket of all time. While NASA would have
sent the space shuttle into orbit with or without Nelson aboard, one must question
whether a congressman took a seat that would have otherwise been filled with a trained
scientist. It should be noted that special interests will attempt to influence the political
process through illicit campaign contributions, honoraria, and paid vacations, federal
agencies are capable of the same actions with the same objectives. Perhaps not in the
United States – and certainly not shown in this case, but in other nations it is feasible for
a bureaucratic agency to bribe an elected official to make an inquiry disappear or to
preserve a higher level of funding. Spaceflight hardly constitutes a bribe, but one can
easily imagine a substantial amount of good will from an oversight committee chairman
after such an adventure at taxpayer expense.
To conclude, we have reviewed four very different examples of what some could
consider politically questionable behavior with very different outcomes. In the case of
Ray Sansom, a political career was destroyed and criminal charges were filed while
Alcee Hastings, who clearly acted improperly and was removed from office by the U.S.
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Senate managed to complete a remarkable political comeback (Biography: United States
Representative Alcee L. Hastings, n.d.), becoming more powerful and prominent than he
had been as a federal judge. From his unlikely stint as a NASA payload specialist,
Senator Bill Nelson has been twice reelected to the U.S. Senate and features his
spaceflight in his political biography as an example of hands-on involvement with his
responsibilities as a senator. Jeb Bush was reelected governor of Florida in 2002 and
served until he was term limited in January 2007, Katherine Harris was elected to the
U.S. House of Representatives from Sarasota and Longboat Key in 2002 and served until
she mounted a campaign for U.S. Senate in 2006, losing to Senator Bill Nelson in the
general election. These cases provide examples of cases that could be perceived as
political corruption and cases that were legitimate, illegal corrupt political actions. This
brings us to a key question: how effective are Florida’s anti-corruption laws and
institutions? In the cases of Ray Samson and Alcee Hastings, the appropriate
governmental body was eventually involved and took action to both put an end to the
corrupt behavior and to eliminate any potential benefit to those involved with the corrupt
action. Albeit the Hastings affair involved federal authorities, but it remains as an
example for our purposes because corrupt schemes may not be limited solely to local,
municipal, county, or state actors. The interesting note about all four of these cases is
that, even in cases where criminal charges were originally brought, they were ultimately
dismissed or did not result in serious consequences to the public officials involved in the
scandals. Cases such as these serve as good examples of situations that could result in an
increased perception of political corruption among the residents of Florida.
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CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSIONS
The adventure that is Florida’s relationship with political corruption is truly as
long and winding as the state’s 8,436 miles of coastline (NOAA, 2012) and viewed from
as many perspectives as the 19,317,568 people who call Florida home (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2013). Such is the case; it is impossible to discuss even a tiny percentage of the
instances of real and perceived political corruption that occur within its borders. We have
learned that political corruption is a timeless aspect of government – as much a question
of the law and specific actions of individuals as it is a question of morality and ethics. We
have also seen the immense challenges posed to researchers as they seek to define,
identify, and analyze this perennial issue in political science. It seems that the relatively
simple question of what constitutes corrupt action on its face is in fact a dense question
riddled with nuance and mystery.

If Florida’s experience with combating political corruption is any indication of the
perplexing nature of this issue, consider two major changes made to Florida’s
constitution in response to alleged or perceived corruption: the 1992 amendment
implementing term limits on elective office and the 2010 amendments implementing “fair
districts” in Florida’s congressional and legislative redistricting process. Both of these
amendments passed by comfortable margins (term limits with 76.77% of the vote and fair
districts with 62.59% and 62.91% of the vote for each of the amendments) and address
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specific governmental concerns. (Florida Division of Elections, n.d.) From the text of the
term limits amendment itself, one can see that it endeavored to keep elected officials
from being more concerned with reelection than they were their constituents. (Florida
Division of Elections, n.d.) Looking back at the implementation of this amendment, we
have seen dramatically increased influence of lobbyists, legislative staffs, and political
action committees – the actors whose’ influence the amendment was designed to reduce
(Carsey and Nelson, 2008, p. 108) (Wagner and Prier, 2008, p. 159-160). In the case of
the “Fair Districts” amendments, it is obvious that the concern of gerrymandering safe
districts for representatives who are not representative of their districts was a key element
to its success. Conversely, the “Fair Districts” campaign was designed as a response to
the creation of political districts favoring one political party over another or one ethnicity
over another (majority-minority districts). (Wagner and Prier, 2008) However noble this
initiative may have been, it came with electoral consequences – namely giving additional
advantage to the minority party in the redistricting process. Immediately following the
2012 general election, one of the first questions posed in the media was how much the
Fair Districts amendments had benefitted the Democratic Party and its candidates
(Associated Press, 2012). The lesson here is that one must always consider the wider
effects of reforms in the name of anti-corruption or government reform. When it comes to
the question of corruption, it is not unprecedented for governments to use anti-corruption
rhetoric as an avenue to discredit or eliminate their opposition (Duhamel, 2004). Such is
the case, would-be reformers and anti-corruption crusaders must be mindful of the
motivations of prominent supporters as well as the broader political context in a state
before working aggressively for policy changes.
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Based upon the results of the term limits and redistricting amendments, it is
reasonable to extrapolate that Florida’s voters have both a deep and long-lasting interest
in governmental reform. This has given rise to organizations (and a cautionary tale) such
as Integrity Florida, which markets itself as “a nonpartisan, nonprofit research institute
and government watchdog whose mission is to promote integrity in government and
expose public corruption” (Integrity Florida, n.d.). Integrity Florida combines research
into public corruption and institutions in Florida with an advocacy role in which those
reading their reports are able to quickly contact elected officials to urge specific reforms.
The combination of pseudo-think tank and advocacy group presents a credibility problem
for this group with a mission of tackling corruption in a nonpartisan fashion. This is
particularly true when Integrity Florida seeks sponsorship from other organizations to
support its research mission. One recent example was the decision to accept funds from a
group called Americans for Prosperity; an organization closely tied to conservative
political causes, to prepare a research report on Enterprise Florida, the state’s publicprivate business development corporation. A possible perception of this action is that
Integrity Florida accepted payment to produce a report supportive of the research
sponsor’s conservative political agenda. Doing so would allow Americans for Prosperity
to adopt a nonpartisan mantle while advancing an argument against government business
incentives (Bousquet, 2013). Even the perception of such an arrangement serves to
delegitimize Integrity Florida as a nonpartisan organization and resulted in dueling
resignations from the Integrity Florida Board of Directors and the Board of Directors of
the First Amendment Foundation (Bousquet, 2013). While one must concede that
sponsorship is needed for extensive research projects, it is necessary to ensure that
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sponsors of research have no financial, political, or rhetorical interest in the outcome of
the research that they are supporting.

Beyond the significant issues in standardizing data and ranking the states
themselves that were discussed earlier lies still another difficulty in preparing research in
political corruption: the constantly changing landscape of the issue. There is always an
exciting scandal just breaking, there are always new laws, and there are always new and
innovative corrupt actions. Given the shifting topography of this field, it comes at no
great surprise that there are also new ideas and initiatives for resolving corruption or
improving transparency or some other well-meaning government reform. The interesting
caveat to all of this is that the answers to the perplexing questions of combating and
preventing political corruption aren’t great mysteries in need of an Indiana Jones-esque
crusader to unearth them from an ancient cave in Florida’s aquifer – policy remedies have
been prepared based upon exhaustive, state-sponsored studies twice in the last thirteen
years. In 1999, the state created the Public Corruption Study Commission at the request
of then-Governor Jeb Bush. This commission returned a report with thorough information
on the nature of political corruption in Florida and several remedies ready for adoption by
the legislature. As if this were not enough, the Nineteenth Statewide Grand Jury was
convened in 2010 at the request of then-Governor Charlie Crist to update the previous
study and to provide new policy remedies for addressing and preventing corrupt political
activity in Florida.
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Taken together, the key recommendations from both the 1999 Public Corruption
Study Commission Report and the 2010 Nineteenth Statewide Grand Jury are the same:
criminalize public corruption violations of the Florida Code of Ethics, ensure clearer
tracking of corruption offenses, and update the law to ensure stiffer penalties for public
servants who abuse their positions of trust. Additionally, the single largest failure of
Florida’s anti-corruption strategy is the perplexing inability of the Florida Commission
on Ethics to launch its own investigations and to impose severe civil penalties on those
who violate the Code of Ethics. These relatively small changes to Florida Statutes would
allow State Attorneys, criminal enforcement agencies, and the Commission on Ethics to
be far more aggressive in addressing, preventing, and reducing political corruption. As
we have seen with the tremendous success of ballot initiatives designed to reform
government and reduce corruption, Florida’s voters support strong anti-corruption laws
and aggressive enforcement.

In sum, political corruption is the unending problem that faces governments and
peoples the world over. Corruption perpetuates poverty, it sows seeds of distrust in
democratic government, and it stands in the way of development not just in the
developing world, but also in places like the United States. In Florida, voters have
demonstrated a sincere desire to reduce perceived corruption in Florida’s government, but
those in power refuse to seriously consider the most pressing suggestions of either the
Public Corruption Study Commission or the Nineteenth Statewide Grand Jury. Since
1999, we have yet to see strengthened criminal statutes and a Commission on Ethics
allowed to act as a true anti-corruption agency. Until these changes are fully
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implemented, one can only expect Florida’s political elite to scratch their heads and
wonder why Florida has once again topped the list of states with the most federal
corruption convictions – a questionable statistic in and of itself that has resulted in
Florida’s inaccurate distinction of being the most corrupt state in the United States.

The key findings of this analysis have been illuminating not just into Florida’s
perspective on political corruption, but on the academic work researching comparative
corruption in the United States. We have learned that a remarkable number of studies cite
the same data either from the U.S. Department of Justice or from Boylan & Long’s 2003
journalist survey. We have seen that a combined approach considering data from
academic, governmental, journalistic, and nongovernmental sources focused on both state
and federal convictions, institutions, and perceptions add accuracy to state-by-state
rankings of corruption. This success aside, the single largest lesson of this analysis has
been that there is a need for further research into comparative political corruption in the
United States – particularly in devising new indices and sources of data. We have also
seen that the definition of corruption is of equal importance to the data used for its
analysis.
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